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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 1502 
LOUDOUN NATION.ctL BANI\: OF LEESBURG 
vs. 
CONTINENTAL TRUST COMPANY, JOHNS. BRYAN, 
RECEIVER, INTERVENER. 
PETITION ,FOR WRIT OF ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT 
COURT OF THE COUNTY OF FAUQUIER. 
'l'o the Honorable, the Chief Justice and the Justices of the 
Supren~e Co~trt of .Appeals: 
The petition of Loudoun National Bank of Leesburg (here-
inafter called Plaintiff) r~spectfully represents to your Hon-
ors that it is aggrieved by a final judgment of the Circuit 
Court of the County of Fauquier entered, on July 24, 1933', 
in certain attachment proceedings therein pending in which 
Plaintiff was the plaintiff, Continental Trust Company (here-
inafter called Defendant), a corporation organized under the 
laws of the District of Columbia, was the defendant, and one 
John S. Bryan (hereinafter called the Receiver) the Receiver 
of Defendant, intervened by a petition to quash the attach-
ment. . 
· A transcript of the record in the· said proceedings i~ filed 
with this petition and prayed to be taken and read as .a part 
thereof. References to the pages of the said transcript will 
be given hereinafter by the insertion of appropriate iiumer-
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als enclosed in parentheses. Italics in quoted matter are sup-
plied by counsel unless otherwise indicated. 
QUESTION AT ISSUE: EXTRA TERRITORIAL 
RIGHTS OF RECEIVER. 
As 'vill shortly appear, this petition presents a single ques-
tion, viz: Is the lien ·of an attach'ment issu,ed by one of the 
cottrts of the Con~monwealth and executed upon land and 
personalty therein situated but owned by a corporation cha!f-
tered by the District of Colu'mbia, for the p~wpose of cond~tct­
ing a trust and loan b'ttsiness valid against a receiver of the 
corporation appointed under the Code of Law for the Dis-
trict by the com.ptroller of the e·urrency before the issuance 
of such attachment? 
Plaintiff contends that the question should be answered in 
the affirmative. 
STATE~fENT OF FACTS. 
As there is no controversy as to the facts of this case, the 
following· summary 'viii suffice: 
· On February 28, 1933 (11), the Comptroller of the Currency· 
appointed, as receiver of Defendant, one Gamble, who re-
signed (14), and thereupon on March 8, 1933, the Receiver, 
JohnS. Bryan, was appointed and duly qualified (14). 
On·lVIarch 15, 1933 (1), Defendant being indebted to it on a 
note for $15,000.00 (3), Jess cer~tain credits (5), Plaintiff pro-
cured from the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Fauquier 
County an attachment in due form (7 ff) against Defendant. 
The said attachment, as shown by the Sheriff's return (10), 
-was duly executed on 1\farch 16. 1933 (10), upon certain per-
sonal property (10), and a large amount of real estate (1'1). 
situated in Fauquier County (iO), and belonging to Defend-
ant (12). 
On l\farch 27, 19R3, the attachment 'vas returned to the 
Clerk's Office (10). 
Thereafter the Receiver filed his petition in these proceed-
ing-s (11 ff), alleging, amongst -other things, that as the at-
tachment had been sued out after his appointment, the Court 
was without jurisdiction to subject any of Defendant's prop-
erty to -the payment of its debts ( J 2) and prayed that the 
attachment might be quashed. A jury was ·called (21) and 
under the Court's instructions. found for the Receiver (22). 
·The attachment and levy were accordingly abated and 
-quashed (23). 
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The relevant portions of Defendant's charter, put in evi-
dence at the trial by the R-eceiver,- are as follows (25 ff): 
''WE THE UNDERSIGNED, do by these presents, pur-
suant to the provisions of Sub-Chapter XI of Chapter XVIII 
of the Code of Law of the District of Columbia, associate 
ourselves together as a company or body corporate to carry 
on a trust, loan, mortg·age and such other business of whatso-
ever nature, as is authorized by said Sub-Chapter, and do 
hereby certify: -
- "
1First: That the name of the company shall be the 'Con-
tinental Trust Company'. 
''Second: That the purposes for whi~h said company is 
formed are: 
'' ( 1) To accept and execute trusts, duties and powers of 
any and every description, .., * •.'' 
'.' (2) To accept the office and appointment and perform 
the duties and exercise the powers of executor, administra-
tor," etc. 
"(3) To receive deposits of money for the purposes desig-
nated in said Sub-Chapter, to loan money upon real and per-
sonal property as security, as well as the security of endorse-
ments, and charge and receive interest thereon and commis-
sions therefore. 
'' ( 4) To act as agents for the purpose· of issuing, regis-
tering, transferring, and countersigning, and also to under-
write, the stocks, bonds, or obligations of any corporation, 
association, municipality or state, or other publi~ authority, 
and to receive and manage any sinking fund or other funds 
on such terms as may be agreed upon. 
'' (5) To issue its debenture bonds upon deeds of trust or 
mortgag·es of real estate as provided by Section 721 of said 
Code. · 
"(6) To underwrite, own, by and sell bonds of the United 
States, of the District of Columbia and of the several States 
and of any municipality, private corporation, or association, 
and other evidences of indebtedness~ as well as the stock of 
any public or private corporation. 
'' (7) To transact such other business and to exercise such 
other powers and perform such duties with reference thereto 
as are authorized by the provisions of said Sub-Chapter re-
ferred to in the first paragraph of this certificate.'' 
·:ICc 
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It will be observed that the charter was granted by the 
Commissioners of the District of Columbia (30). 
Reference is also made to a certificate of the Comptroller 
of the ·Currency issued at the time the charter was granted 
( 30). The relevant portions thereof as follows: 
"WHEREAS, the 'CONTINENTAL TRUST COl\£-
. PANY', located in the District of Columbia, has filed with 
me a copy of its certificate of org~nization: arid charter under 
the provisions of sub-chapter eleven of chapter -eighteen of 
the Code of ·Laws of the District of Columbia:'' 
''This is to certify that the said Company has complied 
with the requirements of said sub-chapter and is entitled to 
have and exercise in the District of Columbia all the gen-
eral and special po,vers conferred and perform the duties 
imposed by said sub-chapter on corporations organized un-
der the first division of section 1 of said sub-chapter to carry 
on a safe depo~it, trust, loan and mortg·age 'business and act 
as administrator, executor, guardian of the estate of a mirior, 
and undertake any other kindred fiduciary duty which may 
be lawfully undertaken by corporations organized under sub-
division one of the first section of the. said sub-chapter eleven 
of chapter Eighteen of the Code of Laws of the District of 
. Columbia. 
In Witness Whereof," etc. 
For convenience of reference, all applicable statutes of the 
District of Columbia and one of the· United States- are set 
out in an addendum to this petition. 
Over Plaintiff's objection, the following instruction was 
given by the Court at the instance of the Rec-eiver (36): 
''The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from 
the evidence that the Co:v,tinental Trust Cmnpany was a trust 
company organized under the laws of the District of Colum-
bia; that the Comptroller of the Currency of the United 
States, in the exercise of the duties of his office took charge 
of and assumed control of the affairs of said Trust Company 
and appointed_ John S. Bryan, the intervening petitioner in 
this action. the Receiver of the Assets of said Trust Com-
pany, and that the said Bryan has executed the ·bond acquired 
of him, then the said Bryan thereby, by operation of law, 
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because the holder of the legal title to all of the assets of 
said Trust Company, including the subject of this attachment, 
and your verdict should be for said Receiver.'' 
. The following instructions were offered by Plaintiff and 
refused ( 34 ff) : 
''The Court instructs the jury that even though they shall 
believe from the evidence that JohnS. Bryan was appointed 
receiver of the Continental Trust Company and has given 
bond as such and is no'v the receiver of said Continental 
Trust Company yet these facts do not invest him with the 
title to the real estate levied on under the attachment in this 
case. 
''The Court instructs the jury that even though they be-
lieve from the evidence that John S. Bryan was appointed 
receiver of the Continental Trust Company and has given 
bond as such and is now tho receiver of said Continental 
Trust Company and has an interest in the lands of the Con-
tinental Trust Company situated in Fauquier County con-
veyed to said Company by deeds of record in the Clerk's Of-
fice of Fauquier County, yet it is for the jury to determine 
whether or not said receiver takes said lands subject to the 
attachment of the Loudoun National Bank.'' 
Plaintiff duly excepted to the allowance of the instruc-
tion offered by the Receiver (37) and to the refusal of those 
off-ered in its own behalf (35). 
1\.SSIGNl\iiENTS OF ERROR. 
• 1. The trial court erred in refusing to strike out the evi-
dence offered by the Hecei ver ( 32). 
2. The trial court erred in instructing the jury (36) that 
if they believed from the evidence that the Continental Trust 
Company was. a trust Company organized und-er the laws of 
the District of Columbia; that the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency of the United .States, in the exercise of the duties of his 
office took charge of and assumed control of the affairs of said 
Trust Company and appointed John S. Bryan, the interven-
ing· petitioner in this action, the Receiver of the Assets of said 
Trust Company, and that the said Bryan has executed the 
bond required of him, then the said Bryan thereby, by oper-
ation of la,v, became the holder of the legal title to all of the 
assets of said Trust Company, including the subject of this 
attachment, the verdict should be for the Receiver. 
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3. The trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury 
( 37) that even though they believ-ed from the evidence that 
John S. Bryan was _appointed receiver of Defendant and had 
given bond as such, and was then receiver of Defendant, yet 
these facts did not invest him 'vith title to the property levied 
on under the attachment in this case. 
4. The trial court erred in holding, as in its actions above 
set out it must have held, that sections 715 ff. and 720 (Chap. 
XVIII, sub-chap. eleven) of the Code of Law for the Dis-
trict of Columbia and/or Chapter 2 of Title 12 (dealing with 
National Banking Associations) of the Code of Laws of the 
United States conferred upon the Receiver any title, rights, 
privileg·e or powers with respect to the property levied on 
under the attachment in this case . 
. 5. The trial court erred in declining to hold that insofar as 
section 720 of the Code of Law for the District of Columbia 
conferred upon the Receiver title to the property levied on 
under the .attachment in this case, the said section was invalid 
as in contravention of Article I, section 8, of the Constitut-
tion of the United States anQ of Amendment X thereof. 
ARGUMENT. 
It 'vill he seen that the foregoing Assignments of Error 
are all embraced in the decision of the question here at issue 
as set out at the beginning of this petition, and before a de-
tailed discussion of the law applicable thereto is entered into, 
brief recourse to general principles may be helpful. At com-
mon la.w the rights and powers of a receiver were strictly con-
fined to the state of his appoinhnent. Beyond its territorial 
limits the decree appointing him was brut~tm fu-lmen: it 
vested nim with no title, whether to real or personal property, 
and did not give him the right to sue. The latter privilege, 
however, has gradually come to be accorded to him, upon prin-
ciples of comity and 'vhere citizens of the State of situs are 
not adversely affected, and this is especially the case when 
he appears armed with a conveyance or invested with title by 
the statute under which he 'vas appointed. Indeed, the Fed-
eral Supreme Court has held that to refuse the right of suit 
in these circumstances is a denial of the full faith and credit 
due under the constitution to the public acts of the State of 
appointment. The question of title, however, does not depend 
on the right of suit (which, it may be observed in passing, 
does not connote a right to recover) but on the character of 
the property. Personalty seems to be g·iven a situs at the 
domicile of the owner, and consequently title thereto passes to 
the receiver if the statute under 'vhich he is appointed cou-
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~ fers it upon him. If, on the contrary, the statute has no such 
:i effect, his appointn1ent does not operate to transf-er title to 
: property of this kind. Rut 'vith respect to real estate, uo 
1 instance has been found in which title thereto was in any way 
, affooted by the appointment of a foreign receiver. This rule 
!'vould seem unavoidable, regard being· had to the high im-
1 portance attached by all governments to matters connected 
!·with the transfer of lands within their borders. The law, 
~then, in brief is as follo,vs: (a) A :foreign receiver is denied 
!,access to loc.al courts, except upon principles of comity or 
l'vhere he is inveRted with title. (b) Title of a foreign re-
:ceiver to personalty depends upon the law of the State of his 
!appointment. (-c) Title to land depends upon the la~ of its· 
1s1tus. 
: In the instant case Defendant is a corporation chartered by 
'the District of Columbia, and, so far as appears from the 
]record, has never been authorized to do business in Virginia. 
',The Receiver was appointed by the Comptroller of the Cur-
! rency, under 'vhose direction, agreeably to the statutes ap·-
, plicable, he was to ''take possession of the books, records, 
and assets of every description'' of Defendant. As is ap-
iparent from the record in this case, the Receiver has never 
itaken possession of the property in controversy. If he had 
'done so, the questions at issue might be different from what 
they ar(~; but, as matters stand, the arg·ument of this peti-
tion may be outlined as follows: 
SUM~IARY OF ARGUl\IIENT. 
; I. THE ~IERE APPOINTMENT OF A FOREIGN RE-
'cEIVER HAS NO EFFECT UPON TITLE TO DOMES-
:rriC REAL ESTATE. 
, II. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE STATUTES UNDER 
tWI-IIOH THE RECEIVER IN THE [NSTANT CASE RE-
CEIVED HIS APPOINTl\1:ENT TO ORANGE OR MO})-
IFY THE PROPOSITION JUST STATED; WHEREIN 
CONSIDER: . 
I 
i a. THE STATU'1~ES APPLICABLE DO NOT IN 
!TER1'IS PURPORT TO DEAL \:VITH TITLE. 
I 
b. THE STATUTES APPLICABLE ARE LOCAL TO· 
TIIE DISTRICT OIF COLUMBIA. AND HAVE NO FORCE 
BEYOND ITS BORDERS. 
: III. THE STAT.UTES UNDER WHIOH THE 'RE-
CEIVER WAS APPOINTED· DO NOT PURPORT TO 
DEAL '\VITH TI'l~LE AND CONSEQUENTLY H.A. VE NO I 
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EFFECT UPON TANGIBLE PERSONALTY SITUATED 
IN_ VIRGINIA. 
IV. IF THE STATUTES APPLICABLE ARE CON-
STRUED SO AS TO AFFEOT TITLE TO REAL ESTATE 
WITHOUT THE DISTRICT Offi1 COLUMBIA, THE 
· SAl\1:E ARE VOID AS IN ;viOLATION OF ARTICLE!,-
SECTION 8, AND .AJ\IIEND~IENT X OF ... THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
These noint.s will be taken up in order. 
I. 
THE 1YIERE APPOINTMENT. OF A FOREIGN RE-
. CEIVER. HAS NO ElFFEOT UPON TITLE TO 
DOl\tiESTIC REAL ESTATE. 
It will be well, in the first place, to recall the essential ele-
ments of this case. It presents a corporation, a citizen of Vir-
ginia, which, though holding a vali~ claim in debt against a 
foreign corporation, is denied the right to enforce it by at-
tachment, on the ground that as a result of proceedings of 
which Plaintiff had no notice, by recordation or otherwise, 
and 'vhich had taken place outside the Commonwealth, title 
to Virginia real estate had secretly passed out of the debtor 
and vested in a receiver appointed under the laws of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. The general policy' of the Commonwealth 
in such circumstances is clearly indicated both by her stat-
utes and by her constitution. Section 163 of the latter, so 
far as relevant, provides : 
''" e * The property within this State, of foreign co·r- · 
porations, shaJ,l aJ,tvays be subject to attachment, the same 
as that of nonresident individuals; and nothing in this section 
shall restrict the power of .the general assembly. to discrimi-
nate against foreign corporations whenever, and in what-· 
soever respect it may deem wise or expedient.'' 
The statutes on the subject are familiar and may be epi-
tomized as follows: 
Code of Virginia, sec. 5192 : 
''Every contract, not in writing n1ade * * * for the 
~onveyance or sale of real estate, * * * shall be void, 
* * *., as to purchasers for value without notice and credi-
tors.'' , .. 
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Id., Sec. 5194 : 
"Every such contract in writing, and every deed convey-
ing any such estate * * " shall be void as to all 
* • * lien creditors, until and except from the time it 
is duly admitted to record in the county • * * wherein 
the property * * * may be • * *. '' 
Id., Sec. 5195 : 
1 ' ' N otwit)lstandi'itg any such writing· sha~l be dul~ admitted 
to record 1n one county * * • whermn there Is real es-
tate • * •, it shall nevertheless be void as to such credi-
tors • • • in respect to other real estate • • • with-
out the same, until it is duly admitted to record in the county, 
* * * wherein such other real estate • • * may be 
. '"' '"' " 
Id., Sec. 5197 : 
''No mortgage, * * * or other encumbrance created 
upon personal pro1Jerty, while such property is located in 
another State shall be a valid encumbrance upon said prop-
erty after it is removed into this State as to * * *credi-
tors unless and until the said mortgage • • * or other 
-encumbrance be recorded according to the laws of this State 
* • * " 
Ag·ainst the background, just indicated, of the policy of the. 
Con1n1onwealth may be projected the general law on the sub-
ject, hy which, it is hardly necessary to say it, that policy is 
held inviolate. Thus :M:inor, Conflict of Laws, sec. 11, is in 
part as follows : 
I 
''It is generally adn1itted that transactions relating to lands 
or immovable property of any kind are to be governed by 
the law of the place where the property is situated (lex loci 
'rei sitae or lex situs). 
''Although this principle is generally recognized, the rea-
son for the doctrine has not ahvays been kept clearly in view. 
In truth it simply constitutes one branch of the first exception, 
already discussed, and what is known as the lex sit~us is, in tho 
last analysis, nothing more than the lex fori. Since immov-
able property is fixed forever in tho State where it lies, and 
since no other State can have any jurisdiction over it, it fol-
lows necessarily that no right, title, or interest can be finally 
acquired therein, unless assented to by the courts of that 
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State, in accordance with its laws. The courts of no other State 
can finally pass upon such questions, so as to give or take away 
from any litigant a claim to the property. On the other 
hand, the courts of the situs of the land will be peculiarly 
rigid in their requirement that the la\v of the situs be com-
plied with in regard to the transfe1· of the title to that class 
of property. ·The policies of each State in connection \vith 
the transfer of land \vithin its limits are justly ranked 
a1nongst the most important of all its policies, no outside in-
terf~rence with which will be tolerated. Every effort is made 
by each State to have its laws touching the· devolution, trans-
fer, and charge of lands within its borders as definite and cer-
tain as possible. Particular formalities are required which are 
not required in other matters. And it is of the utmost import-
ance that the legal records of such transactions, constituting 
chains of title to land, should be kept free from blemish, ir-
regularity, or confusion with the requirements of other .States. 
''Hence it becomes peculiarly a part of the policy of every 
State that no transaction relating to the transfer of any in-
t~rest in or title to immovable property situated there shall 
be upheld, if violative of its own la,v, whether valid by the 
laws of foreign States or not. These considerations are am-
ply sufficient to induce the courts of the situs of land (when 
~he situs is the forum) to prefer their own laws upon this sub-
ject to those of any other State.'' 
Nor is the same eminent authority less positive when he 
deals with the narrower question in controversy here, viz : 
the title of a foreign receiver. In the work referred to, sec. 
117, he says: 
"Receivers, bei11.g mere officers of the court appointing 
thettn, it will be readily seen that, inherently an(l as a matter 
of right, they can ha1Je no title, po1per, or a'uthority beyond the 
limits of that cou.rt's jurisdiction. 
"But upon principles of comity, always recognized and in 
general acted upon, receivers .appointed in one jurisdiction 
are permitted elsewhere to protect interests and enforce 
claims of which they are the custodians. But the title of the. 
foreign receiver to property in a State 'vhose residents are 
creditors of the in'3olvent concern will not be recognized there 
as against them, at least if they are not parties to the foreign 
litigation out of which the receivership grew. In order to 
give him such rights against citizens of the State where the 
property in question is located, he must be appointed a re-
ceiver by its courts. 
''So, if the recognition of the foreign receivership would 
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contravene the policy of another State, it will not be recog-
nized there. Nor will it be reeognized, even as against non-
resident creditors who have attached or otherwise secured a 
lien upon the property before it was actually vested in the 
receiver, unless perhaps where the lien creditor is a citizen 
of the same State \Vhose court has appointed the receiver. 
''Property situated in the State of his appointment becomes 
vested in the receiver by. the· very fact of his appointment, 
without possession thereof actually taken by him; but a.s to 
property outside of that State, in those cases where the au-
thority of a foreign 'receiver will be recognizell, he will not be 
re,qarded as having acquired title until he has actually gained 
control over the property.'' 
The precise principle here under discussion seems never to 
have received affirmation by this honorable Court. It is true 
that the title of a foreign receiver 'vas dealt with in Bockover 
vs. Life Association, 77 V a. 85 ( 1883), a case which will be 
given full attention hereinafter. For the present, suffice it 
to say that it is ·expressly confined to personalty and can there-
fore have no application to real estate, a class of property, as 
has been said, which is subject to rules much more rigid and 
much more jealous of the rights of the State of situs. Ab-
sence of Virginia authority, however, is well supplied by an 
abundance of decisions in other jurisdictions. The leading 
case on the extraterritorial rights and. powers of a. receiver 
is undoubtedly Booth vs. Cla·rk, 17 Ho,v. 322 (1854), the doc-
trine of which has been repeatedly affirmed by the Federal 
Supreme Court. It does not, indeed, directly involve title, but 
only the right to sue. This. however. can hardly'be objected 
against its use in the present argument, since, whatever may 
be thought of the converse of the proposition, it will not be 
gainsaid that a receiver who is not permitted to sue cannot 
be said to have title. But how·ever this may be the case has 
often been used as authority in denying the title of a foreign 
receiver to domestic real ·estate. The facts of Booth vs. Clark 
are as follows : The appellant Booth had been appointed re-
ceiver in New York, upon a creditors' bill brought in one of 
the circuit -courts of that State, of the equitable assets and 
choses in action of the debtor, Clark. Many years later he 
instituted suit in the Circuit Court for the District of Colum-
bia to assert his rights as receiver with respect to an indem-
nity recently awarded Clark by the Republic of 1Yiexico, 
'vhich had been in litigation since approximately the time of 
filing of the original -creditors' bill. The Circuit Court of the 
..._,_,- - ~---
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District dismissed the proceedings instituted by Booth and 
in an elaborate opinion by Mr. Justice Wayne, the dismissal 
was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Its conclusions are set 
out as follows (p. 354): 
. '' Our industry has been tasked unsuccessfully to find a case 
in which a receiver has been permitted to sue in a foreign ju-
Jj.sdiction for the property of the. debtor. So far as we can 
find, it has not been allowed in an English tribunal; orders 
have been given in the English chancery for receivers to pro-
ceed to execute their functions in another jurisdiction, but 
we are not aware of its ever having been permitted by the 
. tribunals of the last. 
"vVe think that a receiver has never been recognized by a 
foreign tribunal as an actor in a suit. He is not 'vithin that 
comity which nations have permitted, after the manner of su~h 
nations as practice it, in respect to· the judgments and de-
crees of foreign tribunals, for all of them do not permit it 
in the same manner and to the same· extent, to make such 
~omity int~rnational or a part of the laws of nations.'' 
And again on page 338 : 
''But apart from the absence of any such case, we t.hinl~ 
that a receiver could not be admitted to the comity extended to 
judgment creditors, without an entire departure from chan-
cery proceedings, as to the manner of his appointment, the 
securities which are taken from him for the performance of 
his duties, and the direction which the court has over him in 
the collection of the estate of the debtor, and the application 
and distribution of them. If he seeks to be _recognized in an-
other jurisdiction, it is to take the fund there out of it, without 
such court having any control of his subsequent action in 
respect to it, and 'vithout his having even official power to 
give security to the court, the aid of which he seeks, for his 
faithful conduct and official accountabUity. .All that could b0 
done- upon such an application from a receiver, according to 
chancery practice, 'vould be to transfer him from the locality 
of his appointment to that where he asks to be recognized, 
for .the execution of his trust in the last, under the coercive 
ability of that court; and that it would be difficult to do, 
w·here it may be asked to be done, without the court exercising 
its province to determine 'vhether the suitor, or another per-
son within its jurisdiction, was the proper person to act as 
receiver.'' 
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So also, reiterating the views just expressed, the Court, iu 
Sterrett vs. Second Nat. Bank of Cincinnati, 248 U.S. 73, 39 S. 
Ct. 27 (1918). said on page 76: 
''Since the decision of this court in Booth vs. Clark, 17 
How. 322, 15 L. Ed. 164, it is the settled doctrine in federal 
jurisprudence that a chancery receiver has no authority to 
sue in the courts of a foreign jurisdiction to recover demands 
or property therein situated. The functions and authority of 
such receiver are confined to the jurisdiction in which he was 
appointed. The reasons for this rule were fully discussed in 
Booth vs. Clark and have been reit-erated in later decisions 
of this court. Hale vs. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56, 23 Sup. Ct. 
244, 47 L. Ed. 380; Great Western Mining & Manufacturing 
Co. vs. Harris, 198 U. S. 561, 575, 577, 25 Sup. Ct. 770, 49 L. 
Ed. 1163; Keatley vs. Furey, 226 U. S. 399, 403, 33 Sup. Ct. 
121, 57 L. Ed. 273. This practice has become general in the 
courts of the United Stat-es and is a system well understood 
and followed. It permits an application for an ancillary re-
ceivership in a foreig11 jurisdiction where the local assets may· 
·be recovered and, if necessary, administered. The system es-
tablished in Booth vs. Clark has become the settled la.w of the 
federal courts, and, if the powers of chancery receivers are to 
be enlarged in such wise as to g·ive them authority to sue be-. 
yond the jurisdiction of th() appointing court, such extension 
of authority must come from legislation and not from judi-
cial action. Great- ltV P-ste1·n J.llining & Manufacturing Co. vs. 
·Harris, supra, 198 U. S., page 577, 25 Sup. Ct. 770, 49 L. Ed. 
1163. ,, 
And in Pri1nos Chettnical Co. vs. F~tlton, 254 Fed. 454 (D. 
C. N. Y. 1918), in which the court refused to allow an an-
cillary receivership on the ground that since practically the 
entire property, both real and personal, of the defendant was 
situated within its own jurisdiction, the primary receivership 
was void, referred (p. 461) to Booth vs. Clark, supra, as hold-
ing: 
''An order appointing a receiver of realty has no extrater-
ritorial operation, and cannot affect the title to real property 
which is located beyond the jurisdiction of the court by which 
the order was made.'' · 
Schindelholz vs. Cullu1n, 55 Fed. 885 (C. C. A. Colo. 1893), 
is a] so quoted in the Pri1nos case, as follows: 
'' 'But an order appointing a receiver of realty has lio ex-1 
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traterritorial operation, ~nd cannot affect the title to real 
property which is located beyond the jurisdiction of the court 
by which the order was made. Booth vs. Clark, 17 How. 322-
328 (15 L. Ed. 164). Such orders, therefore,. only operate in 
persona'm, and upon those persons who arc so related to the 
court, either as parties to the litigation, or by virtue of resi-
dence and citizenship, that they are ·bound to yield obedience 
to its orders.' '' 
Should further authority be required, the following cases 
1nay also be cited: 
City Ins. Co. vs. Contrnercial Bank, 68 Ill. 349 (1873). Here 
a receiver appointed by the Supreme ·O'ourt of Rhode Island 
for the Con1mercial Bank moved to quash an attachment on 
lands in Illinois issued in favour of the insurance company 
subsequently to the receiver's appointment. The motion was 
denied in 'vords so apposite to the case at bar that a rather 
lengthy quotation from the opinion may perhaps be pardoned. 
The court said in part (p. 553 ff) : 
''The principle upon which counsel endeavored to main-
tain this judgment is, that the property has been sequestrate'd 
to the use of all the creditors of the bank by decree of court, 
and the title therehy became vested in the claimant, as receiver 
or assignee, by operation of law. 
''Whatever may he the effect of the decree of court in the 
State where rendered, under the local la,vs, it is difficult to 
comprehend upon what principle it can operate to divest title 
in real estate in Illinois. The decree must be construed to 
have this effect, otherwise it can constitute no defense to the 
action. Ho'v can it be said the decree can have any extrater-
ritorial operation, so as to divest one party of the title and 
confer it upon another? No doctrine is better settled by au-
thority, than that the title to real estate or immovable prop-
erty can only be affected in the mode recognized by the laws 
of the State ·within 'vhose territory it is situated. There are 
cases which go to the extent of holding the personal chattels, 
thoug·h situated in foreign countries, pass, by operation of 
law. absolutely to the assignee or receiver appointed under 
the insolvent law of the State where the parties are domiciled. 
The cases proceed on the fiction, personal property has no 
situ,s for any purpose, and if, by any act of the owner, or by 
operation of the law of his domicil, the title is transferred, it 
will be valid as between citizens of the same State. 
''Whatever may be the doctrine on this question as to per-
sonal property, it is not possible to maiutain it in its appli-
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~ation to real property situated in a foreign jurisdiction. 
Mr. Story concedes that the courts of England and the United 
States have arrived at opposite conclusions as to the effect of 
statutable transfers of movable property, under the bankrupt 
or insolvent laws of the debtor'·s domicil. But he adds, 'all 
the authorties in both countries, so far as they go, reeognize 
the principle, to its fullest extent, that real estate or Un-
movable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the gov-
ernment 'vithin whose territory it is situated. Ind-eed, so 
firmly is this principle established, that in ~ases of banlrruptcy 
the real estate of the bankrupt situated in foreign countries 
is universally admitted not to pass under the assignment, al-
though, as 've have seen, there is great diversity of opinion 
as to movables.' Story, Conflict of Laws, sec. 428. '' 
''No property other than realty is involved in this litigation, 
and if it is intended to apply the principles suggested to 
it, we must be permitted to express our dissent. This court 
has decided the title to lands situated in another State can 
not he invalidated by a decision of an inferior court of this 
States, ~and whether the title is a nullity must depend on the 
local laws of that State. Cooley vs. Scarlett, 38 Ill. 316. 
"If titles could be affected by local laws or decisions of 
courts of another State, of what avail wou~d be all our regis-
try laws? A party might appear on the record to be the owner 
of valuable real property, the title to which has been trans-
ferred ·to another by operation of law or a 'decision of a court 
of another State. Aside from the question of policy, it is an 
unans,vcrable objection to the right set up by the interplead-
ing claimant that the law.s of Illinois have not provided that 
title to lands within the limits of the State may be transferred 
by operation of the laws of a foreign State, or the decision 
of its courts. Lands can only be alienated in the mode pre-
scribed by our laws." 
Finally, J( ruger vs. Bank of Comrnerce, 31 S. E. 270 (N. 
C. 1898), lays down .an identical rule. The Court said: 
"Had th~ foreign receiver come in and made himself a 
party to the action, and put his affidavit in the form of. a 
verified answer, it would not have defeated the plaintiff's 
right to judgment; for it did not negative the plaintiff's 
grounds of recovery, but set up the appointment of receivers 
for the defendant corporation at its residence in New York. 
The court here having acquired jurisdiction by the levy of the 
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attacl}ment upon the defendant's realty in this state, the plain-
tiff's lien cannot be dev~sted in the appointment of receivers 
in another state. Moseby vs. B'ltrrow, 52 Tex. 396. The ap-
pointment of receivers in the state of defendant's residence 
has no extraterritorial effect (Booth vs. Clark, 17 How. 322, 
338), though the courts of other states, as a matter of comity, 
may permit such receivers to bring actions in their courts. 
where this will not militate to the injury of their own citizens 
(6 Thomp. Corp., Sees. 7334-7344; Hunt vs~ Insurance Co., 
55 Me. 290; Beach, Rec., sec. 685).'' 
After quoting from City Ins. ·co. vs. Commercial Bank, su-
pra, the opinion continues : 
''The decree in New· York declaring insolvency and appoint-
ing receivers~ has no effect upon the title to real property in 
another state. 6 Thomp. Corp., sec. 7343, and cases there 
cited. If titles could be affected by decisions of the courts of 
another state, of what avail would be our registration laws f 
This sums up the doctrine as almost universally recognized. 
Day vs. Telegraph Co., 66 1\ild. 354, 7 Atl. 608." 
The cases just cited leave no doubt that the jealousy of the 
State of situs of land is as much directed towards a foreign 
receiver as towards any other interf.erence ·with its \prerog-
atives. It will, however,.be objected that none of these cases 
deal with receivers ·appointed by an executive officer, as is true 
of the case at bar, where the appointment was made by the 
Comptroller of the Currrencey. :6ut if the fact that the 
Comptroller is a federal officer-which will be dealt with 
very shortly-is left out of consideration, the objection will 
be seen to have little weight. It needs no citation of authority 
to sb?w that so far as concerns the extent of their several 
po,vers the.re is no difference in the world between a court 
receiver on the one hand, and, on the other, one whose appoint-
ment is purely statutory in origin. It could hardly be asserted 
that, supposing· the Virginia Commissioner of Insurance were 
authorized by statute, without having to apply to a court for 
the purpose, to name a receiver for, say, a domestic insurance 
compa.ny and the statute further provided that the appoint-
ment operated to carry title to all the property, real and per-
sonal and wherever situated, of the company,-it could hardly-
·be asserted that the appointee would have any greater right~ 
with respect to land in North Carolina, say, than if he had 
been appointed by the Chancery Court of Richmond and by 
its decree invested with similar title. ·But, will argue coun-
sel for the Receiver, this case is, precisely, one in which the 
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appointment was made by a federal officer. Precisely; but 
if what has been said has any weight at all, counsel hav.e a 
heavy burden if they would establish the strange proposition 
that the appointment of any foreign receiver whatever can 
affect title to domestic lands. They are not only faced with 
the a p1·io-ri objections to the doctrine; they must also 
show (a) that the statutes under which the Receiver in this 
case was appointed purport to confer title, (b) that, if they 
do, Oongress intended to make thern effectual beyond the 
territorial limits of the District of Columbia, and finally, (c) 
that even if Congress so intended it had the power, under the 
Constitution, to enact its intentions into law. . 
It cannot be too earnestly insisted that those who say that 
the statutes involved, in their asserted application to this case, 
are constitutional, have the burden of establishing the propo-
sition. The federal government, supreme though it may be 
within its field, is one of delegated powers. If it is contended 
that the Comptroller of the Currency has been given power to 
transfer, by executive order only, title to land in one of the 
States, clear constitutional warrant for the contention should 
be exhibited. A trustee in bankruptcy, it is true, by virtue of 
his appointment, takes title to lands belonging to the bankrupt 
and situated in another State; but the Constitution gives 
Congress power to establish uniform laws on the· subject of 
bankruptcies throughout the United States. Further, in the 
case of national banks, which are agencies for the creation of 
currency, Congress could doubtless have provided-though in 
fact, as will soon be shown, it has not aone so,- -that receivers 
appointed therefor have the same rights and powers with re-
spect to foreign lands as trustees in bankruptcy. But De-
fendant i~ not a national bank. It was chartered by the 
District of Oolumbia,-not, as in the case of a national 
bank, by the Comptroller of tl1c Currency-and its powers arc 
those of a trust con1pany or bond hou:;:e. 
So much having been premised, it remains to show, in anti-
cipation of the arguments in behalf of the Receiver: first, 
that the applicable statutes do not purport to give him title 
(as distingui.Hhed from the right of possession) to the assets 
of Defendant, whether real or personal; secondly, that even 
if they were patent of such a construction, they are local to 
the District of Columbia and do not affect title to lands in 
~Vir,g-inia; hnd thirdly, that to give them an extraterritorial 
operation is to render them unconstitutional and void. 
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II. 
THERE IS NOTHING IN THE STATUTES UNDEH, 
WHICH THE RECEIVER IN THE INSTANT CASE 
REOEIVED HIS APPOINTl\iENT TO GIVE HIM Tl-:-
TLE TO LAND IN VIRGINIA: vVHEREIN CONSIDER·: 
a. THEY DO NOT PURPOR·T TO DEAL WITH TITLE. 
Section 720 of the Code of the District of Columbia, 1924, 
'vhich is a part of Chapter XVIII, subchapter XI, referred to 
in Defendant's charter (25; supra, p, 3), and set out in full 
iu the Addendum to this petition, provides for reports to be 
1nade to the Con1ptroller of the Currency by corporations such 
as Defendant, and confers visitorial powers upon the Comp-
troller, who 
"shall have power, 'vhen in his opinion it is necessary to .take 
possession of any such c01npany for the reasons and in the 
manner and to the Rame extent aR are provided in the laws 
of the United States with respect to national banks." 
It therefore becomes material to asc-ertain the powers of 
the Comptroller with respect to national bank. The acts by 
which these powers are conferred are likewise set out in full 
in the Addendum, and so far as they are relevant read as fol-
lo,vs: 
· U. S.C., Tit. 12, Banks and Banking, sec. 191 (June- 30, 1876, 
c. 156, sec. 1, 19 Sta.t. 63)-'' >K• ~ * whenever the comptroller 
shall become satisfied of the insolvency of a. national banking 
association, he may * ~ • appoint a. receiv.er who shall proceed 
to close up such association, and enforce the personal liability 
of the shareholders * • * ". 
I d., ibid., sec. 192 (R. S., sec. 5234; 1\tiay 15, 1916, c. 121, 39 
Stat. 121)-" * • • Such receiver, under direction of the 
comptroller, shall take possession of the books, records and 
assets of every description of such (national banking) asso-
ciation, collect all debts, dues and claims belonging to it, and, 
upon the order of a court of record of competent jurisdiction, 
* e • may sell all real and personal property of such asso-
ciation, • • • and may, • • • enforce the individual liability of 
the stockholders.'' · 
A reading of these sections would seem to show, without 
the necessity of argument, that transfer of title to receiver is 
not contemplated. It is well known that the ordinary chancery 
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receiver does not take title, 'even without the jurisdiction of 
the court by which he was appointed. Hannan vs. McMullen, 
85 Va. 187 (1888).; Davis vs. Bonney, 89 Va. 755, 760 (1893). 
Under the decree of appointment the r-eceiver is to take pos-
session ; his possession is that of the· court and its inviolability 
is due to the actual or implied injunctive effect of the decree. 
W'here posse·ssion l1as not been given, it is to be acquired and 
of course all transactions of the r·eceiver are subject to thf3 in-
struction or approval of the court. And this, to one coming 
to their perusal with a fresh mind, seems to be the clear pur-
port of the federal and District statutes just quoted. They 
call upon the receiver to take possession, order him to col-
lect the debts due his trust, and provide that all further steps 
are to be taken ''upon the order of a· court of record of com-
petent jurisdiction''. This feature deserves to be noticed 
carefully. What is "competent jurisdiction" f An examina-
tion of the authorities, which need not be repeated liere, · 
shows that it may be· either federal ·or State, and-it is this 
further fact upon which special emphasis is. laid-not a sin-
gle case has been found in which the court applied to for per-
mission to sell land was not one within whose jurisdiction the 
land was situated. Such a state of affairs is significant, and 
if the theory of the trial court in the instant case were sound, 
there seems to be no reason why the Receiver should ever have 
been troubled to come to Virginia at all. He could have 
ignored the attachment, selling the land upon application to a 
court in the District of Columbia, and the purchaser's title 
would have been superior to Plaintiff's lien. 
These considerations are theoretical. A. very practical argu-
ment will be found in two cases decided in the United States 
Supreme Court, one of which deals 'vith very similar language 
in an Alabama Act, the other with the effect of the very 
statute under consideration. The· first is Sterrett vs. Second 
National Bank, 248 U. S. 73, 39 S. Ct. 27 (1918), which has 
been quoted in an earlier part o:D this petition. Her·e the 
inquiry was whether a receiver ap·pointed by an Alabama 
court of chancery was entitled to sue in the United States 
District Court of Ohio, and the answer depended, as will be 
seen, on the further question of title. In .order to decide this, 
the Court was called upon to c.onsider the applicable statutes, 
as follows (p. 75): 
''The material parts of the sections of the Code of Alabama 
(1907, vol. 2, pp. 430, 433), pertinent to this case, provide as 
follows: · 
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'' '3509. • • 9 The assets of insolvent corporations constitute 
a trust fund for the payment of the creditors of such cor-
porations, which may be marshaled and administered in (!Ourts 
of equity in this state.' 
'~Section 3511 provides for the dissolution of corporations 
by aation of the stockholders, and ·enacts that the court-
" ' ljJ a e shall appoint_ a _receiver of all the books, property 
t;tnd assets of the. corporation "" • * (who) ~hall, under the 
direction of the court, collect all debts due the corporation, 
~nd sell all the property, r€al and personal, of the corpora-
tion, pay the debts thereof ratably or in full as the funds 
~-ealized may admit, and ·divide the residue after the debts and 
costs are paid, among the several classe~ of stockholders, ac-
~ording to the amount owed by each, and ac~ording to the 
preferences, if any, of the several classes as provided in the 
certificates of incorporation.' 
. 
1
' S'ection 3512 ·covers the application for receivership and 
dissolution of insolvent corporations upon bill of creditors 
or stockholders in the chancery court, and provides : 
" '* ·• * The court fs * * may·appoint a receiver of all the 
property and assets of the corporation • • • (who) under t}?.e 
direction of the court, must exercise the same powers and 
perform the same duties as are required of receivers in the 
next preceding section, and otherwise manage the affairs of 
the corporation pending final settlement thereof as the court 
shall direct • • • . ' 
''There is also a provision for proceedings by the attorney 
general (page 444) : 
" '3560. Proceedings when bank found not solvent-When-
ever the treasurer finds that a bank or corporation chartered 
by the laws of this state and doing a banking business, is not 
in a solvent condition, he shall immediately report the condi-
tion of the bank to the governor, and the governor shall 
direct the attorney general to institute proceedings in a 
court having jurisdiction in the county 'vhere the bank or 
parent bank is located, to put the bank in the hands of some 
competent person, who shall give bond in an amount to be 
fixed by the judge for the faithful discharge of his duties, 
and said person so appointed shall immediately take charge 
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of the business of said bank, collecting its assets and paying 
off its liabilities under the law and. rules of such court.' '' 
After referring to Booth vs. Clark, supra, in a passage 
already quoted, the question to be decided is thus expressed 
(p. 77): 
''Counsel for petitioner insists that the case is not ruled 
by the iloctrine of Booth vs. Cla-rk, and that under the Ala-
bama statutes and the decisions of the Supreme Court of that 
state the title to the property of th~ Trust Con1pany is vested 
in the receiver in such wise that he is authorized to sue for 
its recovery in the courts of a foreign jurisdiction. If this 
contention is well founded there is no question of the au-
thority of the receiver to prosecute this action.'' 
The question is then answered (p. 78): 
'"An examination of the sections of the statutes, here in-
volved, iu the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court" 
of Alabama, does not in our opinion warrant the conclusion 
that title is vested in the receiver as assignee or as statu-
tory successor of the· insolvent corporation in· such wise as 
(.0 authorize the action to recoYer in a foreign 'jurisdiction. 
Collectively, these sections provide for a receivership to ad-
minister the property and assets of the insolvent corporation 
upon· the authority- and direction of the appointing court. 
The stattttes do not -undertake to ·vest in the receiver at/. estate 
in the property to be administered for the bmtefi.t of creditors 
as was the case in Bentthein~er vs. Converse, S-ltpra, and Con-
verse vs. H antilton, st11pra, in which the right to sue in the 
rourts of a foreign jurisdiction was sustained.'' 
If, now, the Alabama statutes are compared with those in 
question here, it wil1 he seen that the latter no more carry title 
fhan the fonner. Both deal with possession, and the right to 
possession alone is c9nferred. But should there remain any 
doubt on this point, it would seem to be entirely dispelled by 
the second of the two Supreme Court cases above referred 
i·o. It is Rosenblatt vs. Johnson, 104 U. S. 462 (1881), in 
which an attempt was made to in1pose a city tax upon the 
property of an insolvent national bank in the hands of a re, 
_c>eiver appointed by the Comptroller or the Currency. The 
conrt ~aid ·(p. 463): 
''The single question in this case is, whether the personal 
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assets and personal pro13erty of au insolvent national bank in 
fhe hands of a receiver appointed by the Comptrolle·r of the 
Currency, in accordance with the provision of sect. 5234 of 
the Revised Statutes, are exe1npt fron1 taxation under State 
laws, and we· have no hesitation in saying that in our opinion 
they are. Such property and assets, in legal conte1nplation . 
. ~till belong to the bank, though in the hands of a receiver, to 
be adntinistered under the law. The bank did not cease to 
P-xist on the appointment of the receiver. Its co,rporate 
capacity continues until its affairs are finally wound up and 
its assets distributed. Bank of Bethel vs. Pahquioque Bank, 
J4 vVall. 383; Kennedy vs. Gibson, 8 id. 498; Bank vs. Ken-
nedy, 17 id. 19. If the shares have any value, they are tax-
able in the hands of the holders or owners, under sect. 5219 
of the Revised Statutes; but the property held by the re-
CP.iver is exempt to the same extent it was before his appoint-
ment.'' 
_ The foregoing, which is the entire op1n1on of the Court, 
it. will be observed, is a.n express construction of R. S., sec. 
5234, or U. S. C., Tit. 12, sec. 192, and clears up beyond any 
question or shadow of doubt the title to the property of De-
fendant. It belongs to Defendant in contemplation of law, 
despite the appointment of the Receiver. The Plaintiff's lien 
mu~t accordingly be valid. 
See also United States vs. Weitzel, 246 U. S. 533, 38 S. Ct. 
381, 382 (1918), in which Rosenblatt vs. Johnson, supra, is re-
ferred to as holding that the assets of an insolvent national 
bank remain its property. 
These decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States~ 
which may be supposed to have the last word on the subject, 
are conclusive. As plainly as possible they show that the 
statutes in question, and principally U. S. C., Tit. 12, sec. 192 
(R. S'., sec. 5234), quoted on page 22, supra, do not operate 
to give the receiver title to the assets of a national bank. It 
ma.y be well, however, to anticipate certain arguments and 
nuthorities that -\viii probably be advanced by counsel for the 
R.eceiver in this case. 
·First of tl1ese will no doubt be lJ. S. C .• Tit. 12, sec. 91 
(R. S., sec. 5242), dealing of course with national banks, and. 
so far as relevant, reading as follows: 
" • • * ; that no attachment, injunction or execution shall 
be issued against such (national banking) association or its 
property before final judgment in any suit, action, or pro-
ceeding, in any State, county or municipal court." 
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If the words quoted applied to De.f-endant, it may be con-
ceded that there would be an eud of this case; hut the short 
answer is that they do not apply. This is established by 
construction afforded by very recent legislation. The Act 
of Congress of l.Vlarch 4, 1933, chap. 274, sec. 4(c), 47 Stat. 
, amending the Code of the District of Columbia, ex-
pressly extended to banks and trust companies of the District 
various sections of the .N atiorial Banking Act, including U. 
S. C., Tit. 12, sees. 191 and 192, quoted on page 22, supra, 
did not refer to sec. 91. Since sec. 720 of the District Code 
(see p. 21, Sl#Jpra) already gave the Comptroller the same 
powers with reference to trust companies as he has in the case 
of national banks, but in rather general terms, the Act of 
~farch 4, 1933, must have been intended as a clarification of 
that section, i. e., sec. 720, and it is obvious that if Congress 
had thought that U. S. C., tit. 12, sec 91-con~erning attach-
ments-should have been brought into the meaning of sec. 
720, it would have taken occasion to say so. As it did not, it 
'vould follow that sec. 91 has no bearing on the present ques-
tion. Furthermore, Defendant is, after all, not a national 
bank, nor a bank at a.ll. A reference to its charter (25 ff; 
.cn_tpra, p. 3), as 'vell as to sections 715 and 721 of subchapter 
XI, Chapter XVIII of the District Code (set out in the Adden-
dum to this petition) will be sufficient to establish this propo-
sition. If any further argument be necessary, it will suffice 
to compare with the sections already referred to sec. 24, 
TJ. S. C., tit. 12 (R. S., 5136), which deals with the corporate 
powers of national banking associations and by which they 
arP. authorized: 
'' 8eventh. To exercise by its board of directors, or duly 
authorized officers or agents, subject to law, all such incidental 
powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of bank-
ing; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, 
hills of exchance, and other evidences of debt; by receiving 
deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin and bullion; 
hy loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, 
issuing and circulating notes according to the provisions of 
this chapter." 
There is a fundamental distinction between these power~ 
and those that have been granted to Defendant. A detailed 
~omparison is unnecessary; the several statutes speak for 
themselves. 
Next in order may be considered some cases relied upon by 
the Receiver before the trial court. One of these is N aJtional 
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Bank vs. Colby, 21 Wall. 609 (1874). It was there held that 
an attachment, levied after a national bank in Alabama had 
become insolvent upon land situated in that State and be-
1pnging to the bank, was void. There are sev.eral points to 
be not~d in con~ection with this decision by which it may be 
safely distinguished .from the case at bar. These are as fol-
lows: , : 
In the first place, the question of the receiver's ·title is not 
involved. The opinion goes no further than to hold that after 
insolvency of a national bank, the policy of Congress, as in-
dicated by the statutes referred to in the opinion, prohibits 
any. interference by would-be lienors against (a) full payment 
to the United States of the currency issued by the bank, and 
(b) a. ratable distribution amongst its other creditors. 
Secondly, even if title were involved, the case does not touch 
upon what is the great question now before this Court, viz; 
t!le effect upon titl~ to domestic lands of the appointment of a 
foreign receiver. As already pointed out, the bank was a cor-
poration existing in Alabama and tl1e land attached 'vas in the 
s.ame State. There was no interference 'vith the policy of 
the State of situs of real property, already shown to be of 
~uch high importance. 
Thirdly, the bank had been dissolved and its charter for-
.feited. Accordingly, title to its property must have been either 
in the receiver or in nubibus. It does not appear that the char-
ter of the Defendant in the instant case has been forfeited. 
These considerations, singly and together, seem to dispose of 
National Bank vs. Colby as a justification for the trial court. 
Fish vs. Olvn,, 76 Vt. 120, 1 Ann. Cas. 295 (1903), is also re~ 
lied on, and seems unusually noteworthy for going beyond 
the issue presented. The receive,r of a national bank in Ver-
mont brought suit in that State against the defendant Olin, a 
resident thereof and a stockholder of the bank, to enforc~ 
his individual liability as such. A demurrer to the declara-
tion was sustained, and on appeal the lower court was re-
versed, it being held that the receiver had title and should 
therefore be permitted to sue. But. this case also c.an be dis-· 
tinguished from the case at bar. In the first place, the prop-
erty involved was a mere chose in action, not land or tangible 
personalty, and the whole business was intrastate. I~ the 
s~cond place, sec. 192, U. S. C., tit. 12 (R. S., 5234), already 
quoted from, supra, pag·e 22, expressly authorizes the receiver 
to enforce the stockholders' individual liability. If in o:rder 
to support. the authorization given by the statute it is coll-
s~der.ed necessary to import into its terms an intention to 
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transfer to the receiver title to choses in action of this char-
acter, it does not thenc.e follow that the receiver is inv·ested 
with title to land in another State. S1;1rely the statute should 
be construed so as to avoid such a conclusion. ' 
The opinion in Fish vs. Olin, supra, refers to Kennedy vs~ 
Gibson, 8 Wall. 498 (1869), as authority for the proposition 
that the receiver of a national bank is its ''statutory assignee'' 
(p. 506). It is proper to observe in this connection. that thP. 
Supreme Court's use of the expression quoted is pure d,ictum, 
the question for decision being whether a bill to enforce 
the statutory liability of stockholders was demurrable for 
failure to allege that the Comptroller had made a preliminary 
determination of the necessity of such enforcement. It may 
also be observed that in any event the later case of Rosen-
blatt vs. Johnson; 104 U. S. 462 (1881), already quoted from, 
and, as has been shown, reaffirmed in U. 8. vs. ffl eitzel, supra, 
decided in 1918, held unequivocally that the assets of an in-
so]vent bank do not belong to its receiver. 
In Fish vs. Oli1~, supra, is to be found the following remark, 
which is worthy of comment: 
"We have not found in our examination of the United 
States cases any direct statement that the receiver has the 
legal title by virtue of his appointment.'' 
Although thirty years have elapsed since the above was 
written, it would still be .true. 
-~,inally, reference may be made to Bockover vs. Life Asso-
ciation, 77 V a~ 85 ( 1883), already mentioned in the course of 
this petition. It was there held tha.t the statutory receiver of 
a Missouri corporation authorized to do business in ·virginia 
takes title upon appointment to debts due the corporation in 
Virginia, in preference to the lien of an attachment sued out 
after the appointment. This case does not trouble Plaintiff. 
In the first place, the l\Iissouri receiver was expressly vested 
by statute with title to all the assets of the corporation. 
Secondly, the corporation was licensed to do business in Vir-
ginia (Defendant was not so licensed) and when it brought 
its charter here the people of this State were chargeable with 
knowledge of its contents and. the general laws n1ade a part 
of it. Thirdly, the property involved :with a chose in action 
and this Court, on page 89, said that it is a. "well settled 
general rule, tha"t a transfer of movable property, good by the 
laws of the owner's domicil is valid, wherever else the prop-
erty may ?e situate". This case can therefore hardly afford a 
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guide to the proper disposition of the real estate belonging to 
Defendant. 
What has been said in this branch of the argument in favor 
of Plaintiff seems to show pretty clearly that the statutes 
under which the receiver was appointed vested him, not with 
title to Defendant's assets, but with the right in their posse~­
sion. But, even were they susceptible of an interpretation to 
the contrary, the Receiver is still far from making out his 
case. This is true because 
b. THE STATUTES UNDER WHICH THE RECEIVER. 
WAS APPOINTED ARE LOCAL TO THE DISTRICT OF 
COLU~IBIA AND HAVE NO EXTRATERRITORIAL 
EFFECT. 
The proposition enunciated above is applicable only to De-
fendant's real estate. Qttoad its personalty, the statutes of 
the District are controlling (if, as is not in fact the case, 
they should purport to carry title) under the rule 'mobilia 
seq-uuntur perso1z.a1n, followed in Bockover vs. Life Associa-
tion, 77 Va.. 85, 89 (1883), s·upra. It is submitted, however, 
that quoad realty, these statutes are local only, and have no 
more effect in Virginia than an act of the ~fa.ryland legisla-
ture. Nor is this conclusion at all qualified by the Act of 
March 4, 1933, mentioned on page 27, supra, which, as pointed 
out, is an amendment of the District Code, and, except under 
the influence of certain constitutional principles hereafter t<> 
be discussed, is therefore without ·extraterritorial effect. 
There is no question here of national banks. Defendant 
is a local trust co1npany, chartered by the. District and not 
by Congress. So far as concerns Virginia, it is a foreign 
corporation and has no more rights and privileges here than 
any\ other such organization. In other words, the fact that it 
was chartered in effect under the authority of Congress is 
not material in this case. See 14a C. J., Corporations, sec. 
3824, Note 20(a), which reads as follows: · 
''A corporation created 'in the District of Columbia' (1) 
by an act of Congress is not a corporation for the entire 
Union and can do business outside of the District of Columbia 
only under the comity of states, on the same terms as other 
foreign corporations. Daly vs. Na.tional L. Ins. Co., 64 Ind. 1; 
Williams vs~ Cresu.;ell, 51 Miss. 817; Layden vs. World En-
dowment Rank, K. P., 128 N. C. 546, 39 S. E. 47; Hadley vs. 
Freedmam's Sav., etc., Co., 2J Tenn. Ch. 122. (2) The District 
of Columbia. is a 'state', within the m·eaning of the statuto 
of Indiana making it unlawful for the agent of any insurance 
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company 'incorporated by any other State than the Sta.te 
of Indiana' to transact business in Indiana without first com-
plying· with the requirements of such statute. State vs. 
Briggs, 116 Ind. 55, 18 N. E. 395. H 
No,v, when Congress, acting as the legislature of the Dis-
trict, provided for the Defendant's insolvency, and in that 
event directed the Comptroller of the Currency to appoint a 
receiver who should have the powers and duties already out-
Hued, what were the territorial limits of the enactment Y Did 
it spread over all of the United States, giving the Receiver 
wider po,vers than Defendant had, or, as seems more natural, 
is the receivership merely co-extensive-in the broad sense 
of that term-with the corporation? 
The answer is given by the great ease of Cohens vs. Vir-
,qinia, 19 How 264 (1821). The principal point involved in 
this case, and tl~e one by which it is generally known, was 
whether or not the federal supreme court had appellate juris-
diction to review the decisions of the courts of the States 
of the Union, but on the merits the question was how far an 
Act of Congress legislating for the District of Columbia 
was binding beyond its borders. The facts were there : In 
1802, Congress, by Act, chartered the city of Washington. 
fu a subsequent a1nendment of the charter the corporation 
was authorized to form a lottery' 'for effecting any important 
improvements in the city'' provided the object for which the 
funds were to be used should be first approved by the Presi-
dent. The lottery 'vas established. Cohens sold a ticket in 
Norfolk in violation of the laws of the Common,vealth a.nd 
was convicted of the offense of so doing. The question was 
whether the charter of Washington, as an Act of Congress, 
should have been a defense. In affirming the conviction, the 
Oourt. answering the question whether the city was em-
powered by the amendment to force the sale of lottery tickets 
in States where such sales were prohibited by law, used the 
following language, in which the parenthetical expressions 
:found therein have been inserted in order ·to make its present 
application clear: 
''In inquiring into the extent of the po,ver granted to the 
corporation of 1Vashington (to the receiver of a trust com-
pany of the District, when he takes possession of its prop-
erty), we must first examine the words of the grant. We 
find in them no expression 'vhich looks beyond the limits 
of the city (District). The powers granted are all of them 
local in their· nature, and all of them such as would, in ·the 
------- --- -- -- ----
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co1nmon course of things, if not necessarily, be exercised 
within the city (District). The subject on which Congress 
was employed when framing this .Act (when authorizing the 
appointment of a receiver to take possession of Defendant), 
was a local subject; it was not the establishment of a lot-
tery (it was not, e. g., a provision for the liquidation of a 
natio~wide corporation); but the formation of a separate body 
fort~ management of the internal affairs of the city, for its 
intern~_ goyernment, for its police (for the case of the in-
solvency of a local trust company, like- Defendant). In dele-
gating these powers, therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose, 
that the mind of the legislature was directed to the city alone 
(to Defendant and similar corporations alone), to the action 
of the being they were creating within the city (to the action 
of' the receiver they were providing for Defendant), and not 
to any extraterritorial operations. In describing the powers 
of such a being (of a receiver for Defendant), no words of 
limitation need be used. But, if it be intended to give its 
acts (those of the Receiver) a binding efficacy beyond the 
natural lin1its of its (his) power, we should expect to find, in 
the language of the incorporating act (sec. 720 of the District 
Code), some words indicating such intention. Without such 
words we cannot suppose that Congress designed to give to 
the acts of the corporation (the power of the receiver) any 
other effect, beyond its limits (beyond the lawful sphere of 
action of Defendant), than attends every act having the sanc-
tion of local law, when anything depends upon it which is to 
be transacted elsewhere (cf. the full faith and credit clause). 
· ''If this would be the reasonable construction of corporate 
powers (of the Receiver's powers) generaU:y, it is more 
especially proper, in a. cas-e where an attempt is made so to 
exercise those powers as to control and limit the penal laws 
(land la.ws) of a state. This is an operation which was not, 
we think, in the contempla.tion of the legislature, while in-
corporating the city of Washington (when providing for the ~ 
appointn1cnt of a receiver). To interfere with the penal laws 
Oand laws) of a state, when they are not levelled against the 
legitimate powers of the Union, but have for their sole object 
the internal government of the country (the control of mat-
ters affecting title to land within a state)·, is a very serious 
measure, 'vhich Congress cannot be supposed to adopt lightly 
or inconsiderately. It would be taken deliberately, and the 
intention would be clearly and 'ltneq'uivocally expressed. An 
Act, such as that under consideration, oug·ht not, we think, 
to be so construed as to imply this intention. unless its pro-
visions were such as to render the construction inevitable.'' 
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These words of the great Chief Justice require no comment, 
and see.{Il, not only in their immediate application, but in their 
bearing and in the force of the policy behind him·, to he of a 
very singular. and preponderating authority. 
As pointed out by the Chief Justice at the close of his 
opinion (p. 131447), laws for the goverance of the District may 
have a universal application and as such be included in the 
supreme law of the land. The example he gives is the Act 
incorporating the city. But from this it does not follow 
· that a law ·providing for the liquidation of a local corpora-
tion is of national effect. How far, territorially, it may -ex-
tend, is a question of intent, and in some cases, as will be 
shown, of constitutional power. 
At any rate, the conclusion. is inevitable that, so far at 
least as concerns real estate, the Receiver's powers and rights 
are local to the District of Columbia and have no effect beyond 
its b·orders. 
III. 
THE STATUTES UNDEI-t WHICH THE RECEIVER 
WAS APPOINTED DO NOT PURPORT TO DEAL 
WITH TITLE AND CONSEQUENTLY HAVE NO 
EFFECT UPON TANGIBLE PERSON-
ALTY SITUATED IN VIRGINIA. 
Under the rule of Bockover vs. Life Association, 77 Va. 85, 
89 (1883), title to personalty in cases of this kind is governed 
by the law under which the foreign receiver is appointed. 
If, therefore, these statutes invest. him with title, this Com-
monwealth has no objection. But the question is, whether 
the statutes in question have any such operation, a question 
purely of construction. It has already been dealt with in 
the early pa1·t of this petition, on pages 21ff., where it was 
shown that the statutes neither of the District nor of the 
United States give title to real estate. This conclusion, it 'viii 
be recalled and it will be here repeated, was in part based 
on Rosenblatt vs. Johnson, 104 U. S. 462 (1881), where the 
question was expressly ruled. But as the ruling was a con-
struction of the statutes themselves, and not a determination 
of their territorial range, it follows that it is equally ap-
plicable to personalty. 
It follows, of course, that the trial court was in error in 
t.his branch of the case; indeed, it is given separate mention 
here for the sake of completeness· and clarity only. 
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IV. 
IF TilE STATUTES APPLICABLE ARE CONSTRUED 
SO :t\.S TO AFFECT TITLE TO REAL ESTATE WITH-
OUT THE DISTRICT OF COLUlVIBIA, THE SAME 
ARE VOID AS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 8, AND AlVIEND~fENT X OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF TfiE UNITED STATES. 
Subsection 17 of section 8, Article I, of the federal consti- · 
tution confers upon Congress the po,ver to exercise '' exclu-
sive legislation in all cases 'vhatsoever" over the District of 
Columbia. These are broad "~ords, but they do not authorize 
Congress to become the don1estic legislature for every State 
in the Union. The question, therefore, is whether Congress, 
in legislating for the Disti·ict has the constitutional power 
to inte.rf.ere with the land laws of the several States, regard 
heing had to the bearing of the Tenth Amendment by which 
the powers not delegated to Congress under the constitution 
are reserved to the State or to the people. 
It may be conceded at once that no authorities have been 
found, for inse1·tion in this petition, having a precise appli-
cation to this question. But in the case of Drape1· vs. Gonnan, 
8 Leigh 627 (1837), it was decided that judgments of the Cir-
cuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia 
are foreign as far as concerns the courts of the Common-
wealth. It had been contended that an act of Congress, au-
thorized by subsection 17 of sec. 8, Article I of the Constitu-
tion, made such judgments don1estic in all the States. Presi-
dent Tucker in a closely reasoned opinion, paralleled by those 
of Judge Parker and Brockenbrough, effectively disposed of 
the contention as follows: 
"It is not my purpose here to go into an enquiry as to 
the extent and the limitations of implied powers. It is ob-
vious that there must be son1e limit arising out of antagonizing 
rights of the states. However convenient and useful certain 
implied powers may be, however necess•ary they may seen1 to 
the express power, they cannot be proper, if they trampf(:) 
upon the rights of the states, and break in upon those sacred 
attributes of sovereignty which the framers of the constitu-
tion never designed to annihilate. But these topics are foreign 
to our subject, since the question we are discussing depends 
on other considerations. 
''The arg·ument, we must remember, is, tha.t to render the 
laws of the district effectual, congress must have power to 
Loudoun Nat. Bk. v. Continental Trust Co. 31-
extend the legislative action for the district beyond the limits 
of the particular jurisdiction. This is to say, in other words, 
that congress may legislate for the states. If, for instance, 
congress can make the judgments of the courts of the district 
conclusive in the states, is not this legislating for the states, 
and not for the district? Whom does suclJ. a provision oblige 
-whom does it act upon? It acts upon our courts, not upon 
theirs. It is then sheer legislation for the states; and thiA 
without any power in the constitution. -Recognize this power, 
and what shall hinder congress from declaring that district 
judgments shall bind lands in the states, and that district 
executions may seize the body or goods of the debtor in the 
remotest state of the Union 1 Upon the principles contended 
for, I see no barrier to such provisions. Every vestige· of 
state authority must yield to so pervading a power. For it 
must .be recollected that the powers of legislation ov-er the 
district are unlimited as to the subjects of legislation; and 
if the legislative action may be extended, in every case, be-
yond the district, it is obvious that congress can legislate in 
all cases whatever for the ~tates, when by any ingenious pro-· 
cess they can connect their legitimate subject of legislation 
with that which they desire to arrogate. It cannot be 
imagined, that in the erection of this territory for the con-
venience and security of congress while engaged in the dis-
charge of their important duties, the framers of the consti-
tion could ever have looked to such a consequence. It is im-
possible they could have designed that congress should have 
power to legislative in all cases for the district, and to extent, 
in its discretion, all the district laws to the states; for this 
would have been to break down the barriers they had so care-
fully erected in other parts of the instrument. 
"Upon a fair examination of the constitution, indeed, 've 
cannot fail to be struck with the distinction between the limi-
tations upon the power of congress when legislating for the 
union, and whenleg·islating for the district. There were only 
two modes of limitation which presented themselve·s; one was 
territorial, the other respected the subjects of legislation. 
vVhen legislating· for the union, it was necessary that 
the power should b~ co-extensive 'vith the union. It 
did not admit of territorial limit. To prevent its 
being unbounded, then, the limitation was necessarily 
placed upon the subjects of legislation. But in the district 
it was otherwise. There it \Vas designed that the power of 
congress should be supreme. It was necessary that it should 
be so, to effectuate the very object of the creation of this 
separate territory. The subjects of legislation within. the dis-
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trict were therefore left without limitation, and to prevent the 
power being unbounded, the limitation imposed was territoriaL 
Thus it is that federal power acts throughout the union, but 
over limited subjects; while the district legislation acts on 
every ·~ubject, but in a limited territory. Such I take to be the 
true ~iew· of these limitations of power; and if it be correct, 
the district legislation of congress must be confined to the 
ten miles square, and neither the implied nor the. express 
powers can be extraterritorial in their operation.'' 
In his dissenting opinion in the recent case of Com. vs. 
Imperial, etc., Co., 160 Va. , 167 ·S. E. 268 (1933), the in-
genuity of the United States Supreme Court in stretching 
the Commerce Clause of the constitution is wisely and wit-
tily compared by :Mr. Justice Epes with ''the ingenuity shown 
by Queen Dido in stretching the compass of her ox hide''. He 
pointed out, however, that the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
was not thereby warranted in abandoning principle and going 
further even than the Federal Court had, in the particular 
matter, actually and unequivocally.held. These words of l\tir. 
Justice Epes have a significant bearing here. Until the 
Supreme Court of the United States shall have unequivocally 
extended the powers of Congress to legislate for the entire 
Unioru through the District of Columbia by saying that it can 
govern Virginia lands by District laws, this Court should 
adhere to the principles it has itself laid down in Draper vs. 
Gorman, supra, and if necessary in the case at bar, declare 
the statutes here in question unconstitutional and void. Such, 
it is submitted, they are, if they are given the only construc-
tion by which the actions of the trial court can be upheld. 
SUM~£ARY. 
In fine, it is respectfully submitted that 
i. because the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury; . 
ii. because the trial court refused to set aside the verdict 
of the jury and enter judgment for Plaintiff; 
iii. because no foreign receiver, merely by virtue of his 
appointment, takes title to land in Virginia, except in virtue 
of some valid, constitutional act of Congress overriding the 
settled policy of the Commonwealth; 
iv. because no such act can be shown in the present case; 
v. because the acts and statutes relied on in behalf of the 
Receiver do not operate to confer upon him the title to the 
assets of the Defendant; 
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vi. because even if these acts and statutes were susceptible 
of any such construction, the Receiver cannot sustain the 
burden, which must, in view of the policy of the Common-
wealth, be upon him, to show that Congress intended them to 
have effect beyond the limits of the District of Columbia; 
vii. because, if Congress so intended, the acts and statutes 
are unconstitutional and void; 
viii. because no inconsiderable amount is involved; and 
finally, 
ix. because questions of high importanoo in relation not 
only to the right of the Commonwealth to control matters pe·r-
taiiiing to lands within her borders, but also to the powers of 
Congress under the federal constitution, are presented for de-
cision and should be set at rest, 
this honorable Court should allow the prayer of Plaintiff's 
petition and the actions and judgment of the trial cour:t should 
be reviewed and reversed. 
STATEl\IENTS REQUIRED BY RULE II. 
(a) It is desired that counsel for· petitioner, the Plaintiff, 
be allowed a reasonable opportunity to state orally the reasons 
for reviewing the decision herein complained of. 
(b) A copy of this petition was on this 12th 'day of Jan-
uary, 1934, mailed to opposing counsel in the trial court, 
Charles Pickett, Esquire, and Barbour, J{eith, McCandlish & 
Garnett, Esquires. 
. CONCLUSION. 
It is respectfully urged that the judgment of the Circuit 
Court of Fauquier County entered in this matter on July 24, 
1933, be reviewed and reversed. 
· .J anua.ry 12, 1934. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOUDOUN NATIONAL BANI{ OF LEESBURG, 
By Counsel. 
~DWIN E. GARR.ETT, 
LEAKE & BUFQR.D, 
LITTLETON l\L '\VICJ{HA~I, 
Counsel. 
-----~-~---~~~--~-
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We, J. Jordan Leake and Littleton l\L Wickham, Counsel 
practicing in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do 
hereby certify that in our opinion the judgment complained 
.of in the foregoing petition for a. writ of error in this case 
should be reviewed by this Court. 
J. JORDAN LEAICE, 
LITTLETON ~L WICKHAM. 
Received ,T anna1-y 12, 1934. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
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ADDENDUJ\II. 
Principal applicable sections of Code of District of .Columbia, 
1924. Chap. XVIII, subchapter XI. 
''Sec. 715. FOR WHAT PURPOSES TO BE FORMED. 
-Corporations may be formed within the District of Colum-
bia for the purposes hereinafter mentioned in the following 
manner: 
''At any time hereafter any number of natural persons, 
citizens of the United States, not less than twenty-five, may 
associate themselves together to form a company for the pur-
pose of carrying on, in the District of Columbia, a.ny one 
of the three classes of business herein specified, to-wit: 
''First. A safe deposit, trust, loan and mortgage business. 
''Second. A title insurance, loan and mortgage business. 
''Third. A security, guarantee, indemnity, loan and mort-
gage business. • * * 
"Sec. 716. ORGANIZATION CERTIFICATE.-Such per-
sons shall, under their hands and seals, execute before some 
officer in said District competent to take the acknowledgment 
of deeds, an organization certificate, 'vhich shall specifically 
. state-
''First. The name of the corporation. 
''-Second. The purposes for which it is formed. 
"Third. The term for which it is to exist, which shall not 
exceed the term of fifty years, and be subject to alteration, 
amendment or repeal by Congress at any time. 
''Fourth. The number of its directors and the names and 
residences of the officers who for the first year are to manage 
the affairs of the company. 
''Fifth. The _amount of its capital stock and its subdivision 
into shares. 
''Sec. 717. POWER OF CO~IMISSIONERS OF THE 
DISTRICT .-This certificate shall be presented to the Com-
missioners of the District, who shall have power and discre-
tion to grant or refuse to said persons a charter of incor-
poration upon the terms set forth in the said certificate and 
the provisions of this subchapter." 
• • • • • • 
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''Sec. 720. REPORTS T.O COMPTROLLER.-All com-
panies organized her€under, or which shall, under the pro-
visions hereof, become entitled to transact the business of a 
tru~t compa~y, shall report to the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency in the manner prescribed by sections fifty-two hundred 
and el€ven, fifty-two hundred and twelve, and fifty-two hun-
dred and thirteen of the Revised Statutes of the United States 
in the case of national banks, and all acts amendatory there-
of or supplementary thereto, and with similar provisions for 
compensating examiners, and shall be subject to like penal-
ties for failure ·to do so. The Comptroller shall have and 
exercise the same visitorial powers over the affairs of the 
said corporation as is conferred upon him by section :fifty-
two hundred and forty of the Revised Statutes of the United 
States in the case of national banks. He shall also have 
pow-er; when in his opinion it is necessary,. to take possession 
of' any such company for the reasons and in the manner and 
to the same extent as ar€ provided in the laws of the United 
States with respect to national bank. 
"Sec. 721. SPECIAL POWERS.-All companies organized 
under this subchapter are hereby declared to be corporations 
possessed of the powers and functions of corporations gener-
ally, and shall have power-
''First. To make contracts. 
''Second. To sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, in 
any court as fully as natut:al persons. 
''Third. To make and use a common seal and alter the same 
at pleasure. 
''Fourth. To loan money. 
''Fifth. When organized under subdivision one of section 
seven hundred and fifteen of this chapter, to accept and exe~ 
cute trusts of any and every description which may be com-
mitted or transferred to them, and to accept the office and 
perform the duties of receiver, assign€e, exe.cutor, adminis-
trator, collector of estate or property of any decedent, guar-
dian of the estate of minors with the consent of the guardian 
of the persons of such minor, and committee of the estates of 
lunatics and idiots when ever any trusteeship or any sueh 
office of appointment is committee or transferred to them, 
with their consent, by any person, body politic or corporate, 
or by any court in the District of Columbia; and all such 
companies org·anized under the first subdivision of section 
seven hundred and fifteen of. this subchapter· are further au-
thorized to accept deposits of money for the purposes desig-
--- ~- ~-- ------ -· ---
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nated herein, upon such terms as may be agreed upon from 
time to time with depositors, and to act as agent for the 
purpose of issuing or countersigning the bonds or obligations 
of any corporation, association, municipality, or State, or other 
public authority, and to receive and manage any sinking fund 
on any such terms as may be agreed upon, and shall have 
power to issue its debenture bonds upon deeds of trust or 
mortgages of real estate to a sum not exceeding the face value 
of said deeds of trust or mortgag.es, and which shall not ex-
ceed fifty per centum of the fair cash value of the real estate 
covered by said deeds or mortgages, to be ascertained by the 
Comptroller of the Currency; but no debenture bonds shall 
be issued until the securities on 'vhich the same are based 
have been placed in the actual possession of the tru8tee named 
in the debenture bonds, who shall hold said securities until 
all of said bonds are paid; and when organized under the 
second subdivision of section seven hundred and fifteen of 
this subchapter said company is hereby authorized, in addition 
to the loan and mortgage business therein mentioned, to so-
cure, guarantee and insure individuals, bodies politic, associa-
tions and corporations against loss by or through trustees, 
agents, servants or employees, and to guarantee the faithful 
performance of contracts and obligations of ·whatever kind 
entered into by or on the pa.rt of any person or persons, asso-
ciation, corporation or corporations and against loss. of every 
kind:" e * e 
Principal applicable sections of the United States Code. 
·u. s. c., Tit. 12. 
Section 24: ''Corporate powers of association. Upon duly 
making and filing articles of association and an org·anization 
certificate a national banking association shall become, as 
fron1 the date of tho execution of its organization certificate, 
a body corporate, and as such, and in the name designated in 
the organization certificate, it shall have power-
''First. To adopt and use a corporate seal. 
"Second. To have succession from February 25, 1927, or 
from the date of its organization if organized after February 
25, 1927, until such time as it be dissolved by the act of its 
shareholders owning two-thirds of its stock, or until its fran-
chise becomes forfeited by reason of violation of la.w, or until 
terminated by either a general or a special Act of Congress 
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or until its affairs be placed in the hands of a receiver and 
finally wound up by him. 
''Third. To make contracts. 
''Fourth. · To sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any 
court of law and equity, as fully as natural persons. 
''Fifth.· To elect or appoint directors, and by its board of 
directors to appoint a president, vice president, cashier and 
other officers, define their duties, require bonds of them and 
:fix the penalty thereof, dismiss such officers or any of them. 
at pleasure, and appoint others to fill their places. 
''Sixth. To prescribe, by its board of directors, by-la.wr; 
not inconsistent with law, regulating the .manner in which its 
stock shall be transferred, its directors elected or appointed~ 
its officers appointed, its property transferred, its general 
business conducted, and the privileges granted to it by law 
exercised and enjoy~d. 
''Seventh. To exercise by its board of directors, or duly 
authorized officers or agents, subject to law, all such inci-
dental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business 
of banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, 
drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by 
receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin and 
bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and by ob-
taining·, issuing and circulating notes according to the pro-
visions of this chapter: PROVIDED, That the business of buy-
ing and selling inv-estment securities shall hereafter be limited 
to buying and selling without recourse marketable obliga-
tions evidencing indebtedness of any person,· copartnership, 
association or corporation, in the form of bonds, notes and/or 
debentures, comn1only known as investment securities, under 
. such further definition of the term 'investment securities' as 
may by regulation be prescribed by the Comptroller of the 
Currency, and the total amount of such investment securities 
of any one obligor or maker held by such association shall 
at no time exceed 25 per centum of the amount of the capital 
stock of such association actually paid in and unimpaired 
and 25 per centum of its unimpaired surplus fund, but this 
limitation as to total amount shall not apply to obligations 
of the United States, or general obligations of any State or 
of any political subdivision thereof, or obligations issued 
under authority of chapters 7 and 8 of this title: .A.nd pro-
1Jided further, That in carrying on the business commonly 
known as the saf-e deposit business no such association shall 
invest in the capital stock of a corporation organized under 
the law of any State to conduct a. safe deposit business in an 
amount in excess of 15 per centum of the capital stock of such 
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association actually paid in and unimpaired and 15 per centum 
of its unimpaired surplus. 
''But no association shall transact any business except 
such as is incidental and necessarily preliminary to its or-
ganization, until it has been authorized by the Comptroller 
of the _Currency to commence the business of banking. (R. S., 
sec. 5136; July 1, 1922, c. 257, sec. 1, 42 Stat. 767; amended 
by sec. 2 of the J\fcFadden Act, Feb. 25, 1927, c. 191, 44 Stat. 
1226.) 
• • • • •· 
1 d., Section 91. 
''Transfers by bank and other acts in contemplation of in-
solv~ncy. All transfers of the notes, bonds, bills of exchange, 
or other evidences of debt owing to any national banking asso-
ciation, or of deposits to its credit; all assignments of mort-
gages, sureties on real estate, or of judgments or decrees in 
its favor; all deposits of money, bullion, or other v.aluable 
thing for its use, or f.or the use of any of its shareholders or 
creditors ; and all payments of money to either. made after 
the commission of an act of insolvency or in contemplation 
thereof, made with a view to prevent the application of its 
assets in the manner prescribed by this chapter, or with a 
view to the preference of one creditor to another, except in 
payment of its circulating notes, shall be utterly null and 
void; and no attachment, injunction or execution shall be 
issued against such association or its property before final 
judgment in any suit, action or proceeding, in any State, 
county, or municipal court. (R. S., sec. 5242.) 
I d., S"ection 191. 
"General grounds for appointment of receiver. Whenever 
a.ny national banking association shall be dissolved, and its 
rigl1ts, privileges and franchises declared forfeited, as pre-
scribed in sec. 93, or whenever any creditor of any national 
banking association shalr have obtained a judgment against 
it in any court of record, and made application, accompanied· 
by a certificate from the clerk of the court stating that such 
judgment has been rendered and has remained unpaid for 
the space of thirty days, or whenever the comptroller shall 
become satisfied of the insolvency of a national banking asso-
ciation, he may, after due examination of its affairs, in either. 
case, appoint a receiver who shall proceed to close up such 
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association, and enforce the personal liability of the share-
holders, as provided in section 192. (June 30, 1876, c. 156, 
sec. 1, 19 Stat. 63.) 
• • 
Id., Section 192. 
"Default in payment of circulating notes. On becoming 
satisfied, as specified in sections 131 and 132, that any asso-
ciation has refused to pay its circulating notes as therein men-
tioned, and is in default, the Con1ptroller of the Currency may 
forthwith appoint a receiver, and require of him such bond 
and security as he deems proper. Such receiver, under the 
direction of the comptroller, shall take possession of the books, 
records and assets of every description of such associat.ion, 
collect all debts, dues and claims belonging to it, and, upon 
the order of a. court of record of competent jurisdiction, 
may sell ·or compound all bad or doubtful debts, and, on a 
like order, may s·ell all the real and personal property of 
such association, on such terms as the court shall direct; 
and may, if necessary to pay the debts of such association, 
enforce the individual liability of the stockholders. Such re-
ceiver shall pay over all money so made to the Treasurer of 
the United States subject to the order of the comptroller, 
and also make report to the comptroller of all his acts and 
proceedings. 
''Provided, That the comptroller may, if he deems proper, 
deposit any of the money so made in any regular Government 
depositary, or in any State or national bank either of the· city 
or town in which the insolvent bank was located, or of a 
~ity or town as adjacent thereto as practical; if such deposit 
is made he shall reql'lire the depositary to_ deposit United 
States bonds or other satisfactory securities 'vith the Treas-
snrer of the United States for the safe-keeping and prompt 
payment of the money so deposited. Sucl1 depositary shall 
pay upon such money interest at such rate as the comptroller 
may prescribe, not less, however, than 2 per c.entum per an-
num upon the average monthly amount of such deposits. (R. 
S., sec. 5234; }fay 15, 1916, c. 121, 39 Stat. 121.) 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
In the Circuit Court of Fauquier County: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of Fauquier County, Vir-
ginia, at the Court House thereof on 12 October, 1933: 
BE IT R·E~1:E~IBERED, that heretofore, to-wit: on the 
15 day of J\IIarch, 1933, came the Loudoun National Bank of 
Leesburg, Virginia, by its attorney, and filed in the Clerk's 
Offic-e of said Court, its. petition in the following words and 
figur€s: 
To the llonorable J. R. II. Alexander, Judge: Leesburg, Va. 
Your petitioner Loudoun National Bank, respectfully shows 
un'to Your I:Ionor that the said principal defendant Conti-
nental Trust Company, a corporation justly and truly in-
debted to the plaintiff in the sum of :B,ifteen Thousand $15,-
000.00 Dollars, whir..h amount was due and payable ~larch 
15th, 1933, the full particulars of which indebtedness are as 
follows: Negotiable note for $15,000.00 dated May 15th, 1930. 
payable on demand to Loudoun National Bank, Leesburg, 
Va., signed by Continental Trust Company, subject to fol-
lowing credits, June 30, 1930, $117.50 Sept. 30, 1930, $232.50, 
Dec. 31, 1930, $230.00, l\Ia.rch 21, 1931, $225.00, June 30, 1931, 
$227.50, Aug. 18, 1931, $2,000.00, Sept. 30, 1931, $215.67, Dec. 
31, 1931, $199.:-33, March 1, 1932, $197.17, June 30, 1932, 
$197.17, .Sept. ·30, 1932, $199.33, and Dec. 31, 1932, $199.33. 
and the plaintiff is entitled to, or ought to recover of said 
principal defendant, at the least the said sum of $15,000.00 
less credits above Dollars. with interest thereon from th~ 
fourteenth day of Nlay, 1930, until paid. 
page 2 ~ Your petitioner further alleges that the said prin-
cipal defendant, Continental Trust Company, a cor-
poration (Is a foreign corporation) not a resident of thi~ 
State, and has estate or debts owing to said principal defend-
ant within the said County of Fauquier, Virginia, and is en-
titled to the benefit of a lien, legal or equitable on property, 
real or personal, ·within the said County of Fauquier, Va. 
Wherefore, Your petitioner asks for an attachment against 
the estate, real and personal, of said principal defendan1. 
Continental Trust Company, a corporation, in the State of 
Virginia, and more particularly against the real and personal 
property of said principal defendant now in the possession 
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and under the control of who your petitioner 
prays may be made co-defendant to these proceedings and 
required to answer and disclose what property belonging 
to the principal defendant is now in possession or under 
control; that the said real and personal property, or so much 
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the claim of your 
petitioner be sold by order of this court and applied in satis-
faction thereof, and that a receiver may be appointed to take 
charge of the attached property. 
And that your petitioner may have such other, further and 
general relief as the nature of its case may require. 
And your. petitioner will ever pray, etc. 
LOlJDOUN NATIONAL BANI{, LEESBURG, 
VIRGINIA, 
By W. A. METZGER, its Atty. 
page 3 ~ $15,000. Washington, D. C., May 14th, 1930. 
On demand days after date we promise to pay to the 
order of LOUDOUN NATIONAL BANK LEES'BURG VA. 
F"ifteen Thousand Dollars, at the Commercial National Bank 
of Washington, D. C. without defalcation, for value received, 
with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from thll 
date hereof until paid, having deposited with it as collateral 
security the following property, which the undersigned has a 
ri~ht to pledge, viz: 100 Shares The Commercial National 
Bank Stock and do agree that the holder hereof may use of 
hypothecate and transfer or cause to be transferred to it-
self or another said collaterial security or any part thereof, 
and may receive the interest and dividends accruing thereon 
before the payment of this note and interest thereon, and 
apply the said dividends and interest to the payment of the 
principal of this note or the interest thereon. or both; and 
do further agree on demand of the said holder to deposit 
with it such additional security as it may from time to time 
require, and in default thereof this note may, at the option 
of the holder of the note, be declared instantly due and pay-
able as though it had actually matured, and upon default 
of payment at maturity, whether such maturity occur by 
expiration of time or default in depositing additional security 
as above agreed, do hereby authorize and empower the said 
holder, for the purpose of liquidation of this note, and of all 
interest and costs thereon, to sell, transfer and deliver the 
whole or any part of such security, or any addition thereto 
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or substitute therefor, without any previous de-
page 4} mand, advertisement, or notice, either at broker's 
board or public or private sale, at any time or times 
thereafter, with the right on the part of the said holder to 
become the purchaser and absolute owner thereof, free of al1 
trusts and claims. And Ijwe do further agree that the securi-
ties thereby pledged together with any that may be pledged 
hereafter, as aforesaid, shall be applicable in like manner to 
secure the p~yment of any past or any future obligations of 
the undersigned held by the said holder, and all securities in 
its hands shall stand as one general continuing collateral se-
curity for the whole of said obligations, so that the deficiency 
on any one shall be made good from the collaterals for the 
rest, and Ijwe do hereby agree to remain responsible for any 
deficiency in payment waiving any benefit, exemption or privi-
lege·under any law now or hereafter to be in force. 
And Ijwe do further agree that should any litigation ensue 
to said holder with respect to the collection of the said note 
or the holding or sale of the said collateral security or any 
part thereof, the said holder shall be paid such reasonable 
Counsel fees as it shall have paid to its attorney for the con-
duct of such litigation, which sum shall be also secured by 
said collateral security, and be payable on demand of said 
holder, in default of which payment said collateral security 
may be sold, as is heleinbefore provided, and Ijwe do hereby 
promise to pay to said holder any deficiency resulting from 
the inadequacy of said collateral.security in this respect. 
page 5 } Seal CONTINENTAL TRUST COMPANY, 
By WADE H. COOPER, 
Address President. 
Attest 
l\L J. 'VINFREE 
Secy. 
F. D. #1323 
Interest paid to June 30, 1930, $117.50. 
Interest paid to Sept. 30, 1930, $232.50. 
Interest paid to Dec. 31, 1930, $230. 
Interest paid to Mch. 31, 1931, $225. 
Interest paid to June 30, 1931, $227.50. 
Paid upon the within $2,000, 8/18/31. 
Interest paid to Sept. 30, 1931, $215.67. 
Interest paid to Dec. 31, 1931, $199.33. 
•: i 
----~--- --- ---~-- ---
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Interest paid to Meh. 3, 1932, $197.17. 
Interest paid to June 30, 1932, $197.17. 
Interest paid to Sept. 30, 1932, $199.33. 
Interest paid to Dec. 31, 1932, $199.33. 
together with a memorandum of lis pe1~dens, in these words, 
which .has been duly recorded in the deed books of .said 
County·:· 
l(now All Men, that I, W. A. l\fetzger, attorney for Lou-
doun National Bank, Leesburg, Virginia, do give notice of 
lis pendens by this memorandum filed in the Clerk's Office 
Circuit Court of Fauquier County, Virginia, ·On the 15th day 
of lVlarch, 1933, which sets forth as follows: 
There is now pending in the Circuit Court of Fauquier 
County, Va., a certain cause, the title of which is 
page 6 ~ Loudoun National B.a11k, Leesburg, Va., against Con-
tinental Trust Company, a corporation, the general 
object of which is to recover from said Continental Trust Com-
pany, a corporation, the sum of $15,000.00 with interest there-
on froml\1ay 14th, 1930, subject to certain credits mentioned 
in said proceedings and to attach the real estate and per-
sonal property of said Continental Trust Company, a cor-
poration, in Fauquier County, Virginih, the description of 
the land belonging to said Continental Trust Company and 
affected hereby is as follows: 1st. All of those nine ·Certain 
tracts or parcels of land adjoining each other and located 
and situated in Fauquier County, Virginia, near l\iarkham 
and containing in the aggregate 2,411.87 acres more or less, 
it being the same .property which was conveyed to Conti-
nental Trust Company by Gardner L. Boothe, Special Com.:. 
missioner by deed dated 2nd 1\Iarch, 1926, and recorded in 
the Clerk's Office Circuit Court of Fauquier County, Va., in 
Deed Book 128 at page 192, et sequor, and to which said deed 
ref·erence is hereby had for a 1nore particular description of 
the property hereby described. 2nd. All of those certain 
lots or parcels of land lying and being in Fauquier County, 
·v a.., near ~farkham, and being lots 1 & 2 Section B. and 12 
and 13 section A. Leeds ~Ianpr Orchard Tract, containing 
in the aggregate 20 acres, more or less, and being the same 
land conveyed to Continental Trust Company by Garder L. 
Boothe, Special Commissioner, by deed dated 15th March. 
1926, and recorded in said .Clerk's Office in Deed 
page 7 ~ Book 128 at page 211 and to which deed reference 
is hereby had for a more particular description. 
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Third. All that certain tract or parcel of land lying and 
being in Fauquier County, Virginia, near l\Ia.rkham, and 
known as ''The Gordon Farm'' and containing 148 acres, 
more or less, it being the same property 'vhich ·was conveyed 
to Continental Trust Company by Josephine Twigg, widow, 
by deed dated 30th April, 1928, and recorded in said Clerk's 
Office in D·eed Book 131 a.t page 302 and to which deed refer-
ence is hereby had for a more particular description of said 
property. 
And the name of the party whose estate is intended to be 
affected hereby is Continental Trust Company, a corporation. 
Witness my hand and seal this 15th March, 1933. 
,V. A. METZGER, (Seal) 
Atton1ey for Loudoun National Bank, 
Leesburg, Va. 
And thereupon the following attachment was issued. there-
un: 
·TO TilE SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF FAUQUIER-
Greeting: 
Loudoun National Bank, Leesburg, Va.., having filed in the 
Clerk's Office of our Circuit Court of the County of Fauquier 
a Petition for au attachment against Continental Trust Com-
pany a corporation to recover of the principal defendant 
Continental Trust Company a corporation the sum of fifteen 
thousand dollars on negotiable note dated 15 ~Iay, 1930, pay-
able on demand to Loudoun National Bank Leesburg, Va .• 
signed by Continental Trust Company, subject to 
page 8 ~ following credits: June 30, 1930, 117.50; ~ept. 30, 
1930, 232.50; Dec. 31, 1930, 230.00; l\farch 31, 1931, 
~25.00; Juno 30, 1931, 227.50; Aug. 18, 1931, 2,000.00; Sept. 
:m, 1931, 215.67; Dec. 31, 1931, 199.33; March 31, 1932, 197.17; 
.June 30, 1932, 197.17; Sept. 30, 1932, 199.33; Dec. 31, 1932, 
199.33, and the said Petition alleging that the claim of the 
Petitioner is believed to be just, and that the Petitioner en-
titled to or ought to recover, at the least, the sun1 of fifteen 
thousand dollars, less credits above 'vith interest thereon from 
the 14 l\'Iay 1930, till paid, and that the defendant is a foreign 
corporation, or is not a resident of this State, and_ has estate 
or debts owing to said defendant \vithiu the County of Fou-
quier, or that said defendant being a non-resident -of this 
State is entitled to the benefit of a lien, legal or equitable, 
on property, 1·eal or personal, wit.hin the County of Fauquier; 
or · · 
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Therefore we command that you attach the specific property 
claimed in the Petition, to-wit: and so much more of the real 
and personal property of the said as shall 
be necessary to cover the damages for the detention there-
of and the costs hereof or the property mentioned and sought 
to be attached in the said Petition, to-wit: the estate 1·eal 
and personal of said continental Trust Company a corpora-
tion, in the State of Virginia and so much of the lands, tene-
ments, good, chattels, money and effects of the said def·endant 
not exempt from execution as will be sufficient to satisfy the 
plaintiff demand. 
. And upon the plaintiff executing the bond required 
page 9 ~ py law, that you take possession of the tangible 
personal property and safely keep the same in your 
possession to satisfy any judgment that may be recovered 
by the plaintiff in this attachment: And Summon the said 
principal defendant Continental Trust Company a corpora-
tion if. they or any of them be found within your bailiwick 
.or any county or city wherein you may have seized property 
under and by virtue of this writ to appear before our said 
Circuit Court of the County of Fauquier at the Courthouse 
thereof, on the 27 ~larch, 1933, and answer said Petition 
or state the grounds of its defense thereto. We further com-
mand you to summon the said co-defendants to appear before 
our said Circuit Court of the County of Fauquier, at the 
Courthouse on the said , in person and submit 
to an examination on oath touching indebtedness to the said 
principal defendant and the personal property of the said 
defendant in possession, or with the consent of the Court, 
first obtained, file an answer in writing, under oath, stating 
whether or not so indebted, and, if so, the amount thereof 
and the time of maturity, or whether ha, in possession any 
personal property belonging to the said principal defendant, 
and, if so, the nature and value thereof. 
And that you make return thereof on the said 27 March, 
1933. 
Witness T. E. Bartenstein, Clerk of our said Court, at the 
Courthouse, the 15 March 1933 and in the 157 year of the 
Commonwealth. · 
T. E. BARTENSTEIN. 
Clerk Circuit Court Fauquier County, Va . 
. page 10 ~ which said attachment was returned to said 
Clerk's Office on 27 ~Iarch 1933 with the following 
return thereon : 
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Executed the 'yithin attachment in Fauquier County, Vir-
ginia, March 16th, 1933, at 4:55- P. M. on the following de-
scribed personal property: Two Mules, Queen & Buggy; 1 
Set of Harness complete; ·Two Mules, Dick & Jim; Two 
Mules, John & Co lie ; Two Mules, Mike & Jack; 8 complete 
sets of Harness; 3-2 Horse wagons, good shape; 1 Myers 
Power Sprayer, 200 gallons; 1 Pr. Sprayers, 300 gallons; 
1 Liquid Duster, 200 gallons; 1 Friend Stationery Sprayer, 
1,000 gals; About 1,200 ft. pipe 3/4 to 11/2 In. including 
valves & Cutoffs ; About 1,000 Ft. spray hose; 1 Blacksmith 
Outfitt Complete; Blower, Vice, Anvil, hammers & 1 Drill 
Press and tons; 4 Long handle Shovels; 2 Mattocks; 2 Picks; 
J. 2-Horse Turn Plow ; 1 Single shovel Plow; 1 Double Shovel 
Plow; 1 No. 10 Caterpillar Tractor; About 4,000 Apple Boxes; 
1 Grindstone; 4 Pitchforks; 1 Lot of sinall Tools; 20 Ladders; 
1 Lot of Apple picking bags; 1 Corby Truck, solid tires; 1 63 
tHO Solid tire Truck; 1 Tractor Trailer; 1 lot of Single & 
Double Trees; 1 Emory Wheel; 2 Cross Cut saws; 1 Seven 
Ton Jack;. 2 Saddles ; 2 Big Pulleys ; 2 Sets Pipe Dyes Com-
plete ; 1 Lot of Small Tools ; 20 Mowing Scythe Sneeds ; 
2 Log Chains; 1 Set Grab Chains; 1 29 Ford Pickup; 1 Rug 
Grader; 25 Tile, 4x12; 1 Lot of Lumber; 2 Mowing Machines; 
1 Big Road Chisel; 
And by delivering a true copy of the. within attachment 
to F. G. "\Vayland found in possession of the above 
page 11 ~ described property, and by levying on 2,411 Acres 
and 197 Acres of Real Estate belonging to Con-
tinental Trust Company, having gone upon said real estate . 
. 
W. S. WOOLF, 
Sheriff Fauquier Co., Va. 
And on the 5 April, 1933, the petition of John S. Bryan, 
Receiver of the Continental ·Trust Company, was filed in 
these words : 
No'v comes John S. Bryan, Receiver of the Continental 
Trust Company, and enters a. special appearance for the 
purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of this court, and :files 
his petition pursuant to the provisions of Section 6407 of the 
Code of Virginia. in the above entitled action, and thereupon 
says as follows : 
1. That Continental Trust Company is a corporation, or-
gani~ed under authority of an Act of Congress to do business 
in the District of Columbia, and by virtue of Title 5, Section 
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298 of the Code of the District of Columbia is subject to 
th~ jurisdiction of the Comptroller of the Currency of the 
United States to the same extent as national banking asso-
ciations. 
:!. That pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by 
the Congress of the United States of America, F. G. Awalt, 
.Acting Comptroller of the Currency, did, on the 28th day of 
B,ebruary, 1933, take possession of the said Continental ~rust 
Company and appoint one Joseph A. Gamble Receiver there-
of; that the said Joseph A. Gamble resigned as such Re-
ceiver, his resignation becoming effective March 
page 12 ~ 9th, 1933, and on the ·8th day of ~larch, 1933, the 
said F. G. Awalt, Acting Comptroller of the Cur-
rency appointed your petitioner, John S. Bryan, Receiver of 
the said Continental Trust Company, to take effect at the 
close of business on the 9th day of March, 1933. 
3. That your petitioner duly qualified as such Receiver 
and has executed bond in the penalty of $50,000.00, all of 
which will appear from certificate of E. H. Gough, Acti~g 
Comptroller of the Currency, dated Jvlarch 21st, 1933, here-
with filed, n1arked Exhibit No. 1 and prayed to be read as 
a part hereof. 
4. That Continental T111st Company is the owner of certain 
re;:tl estate, situated in Fauquier County, Virginia, which is 
the subject n1atter of this attachment. · 
5. That by operation of law, tl1e title to the said real estate 
is now vested in your petitiQner, 'vho is charged with the duty 
of administering the assets of Tl1e Continental Trust Com-
pany for the benefit of all of its creditors, iflcluding Loudoun 
National Bank. 
6; That the attachment in this action was sued out of the 
Clerk's Office of this court on :1\farch 15th, 1933, after the 
Comptroller of the Currency had taken charge of the affairs 
of Continental Trust Company, and that, therefore, this court 
is 'vithout jurisdiction to subject any property of Continental 
Trust Company to the payment of its debts, the remedy of 
all of its creditors being before the Con1ptroller of the Cur-
rency of the United States, who is charged by law 
page 13 ~ with the duty of paying the creditors of Continental 
Trust Company in accon1ance with the priorities 
established by the Congress of the United States. 
WHEREFOR-E, the premises considered, your petitioner 
prays that the attachment heretofore issued may be forthwith 
quashed, and that this action may be abated by reason of the 
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lack of jurisdiction of this court to hear and dispose of this 
proceeding. 
JNO. S .. BRYAN, 
Receiver of Continental Trust Co. 
BARBOUR, I{EITH, 1\IcCANDLISI-I & GARNETT, 
Attorneys for Petitioner. 
together with a certificate of the Comptroller of the Currency 
of the Treasury Department, in these words : 
CERTIFICATE FOR CERTIFIED COPY. 
Treasury Department, Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, ss: 
Under the provisions of Section 884 of the Revised Statutes 
of the United States, I, E. H. Gough, Acting Comptroller of 
the Currency, do hereby certify that the paper hereto a.ttached 
is a true and complete copy of the original commission of 
John S. Bryan, Receiver of the Continental Trust Company, 
vVashington, D. C., dated ~larch 8, 1933, and signed· F. G. 
Awalt, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, and of the whole 
of such original on file and of record in this office. 
I further certify that said John S. Bryan has 
page 14 ~ furnished bond elated ~Iarch 9, 1933, in the sum of 
$50,000, has taken charge of the bank named and is 
still acting as R·eceiver thereof. 
In T·estimony -\¥hereof, I l1ave hereunto s·ubscribed my 
nan1e and c.ausecl my seal of office to be aflixecl to these pres-
ents at the Treasury Department, in the City of vVashiugton 
and District of Columbia, this twenty-first day of 1\IIarch, 
A. D. 1933. 
(Official Seal) E. H. GOUGH:~ 
Acting Comptroller of the Currency. 
Treasury Department, Office of the Comptroller of the 
Cur~·ency, Washington, D. C., March 8, 1933. 
Whereas, Joseph A. Gamble was duly appointed and conl-
lnissioned R.eceiver of "Continental Trust Cmnpany", located 
in the City of \Vashington, and District of Columbia., on the 
t.wcnf.y-eight day of February, 1933, and whereas the said 
.Joseph A. Gamble has resigned to take effect at the close of 
business t.iarch 9, 1933. 
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Now, Therefore, I, F. G. Awalt, ·.Acting Comptroller of 
the Currency,- do hereby appoint John S. Bryan Receiver of. 
''Continental Trust Company'' to take effect at the close 
of business on the ninth day of March, 1933, in place of the 
said Joseph A. Gamble, with all powers, duties and responsi-
bilities given to or imposed upon a Receiver under the pro-
visions of the R-evised Statutes of the United State·s which 
authorize the appointment of a Receiver. In Witness Where-
of, I have hereto subscribed my name and caused my seal 
of office to be affixed to these presents, at the City of Wash-
ington, in the District of Columbia this eight day -of March, 
A. D. 1933. 
page 15 ~ 
(Seal) 
F. G. AWALT, 
Acting Comptroller of the Currency. 
And on 5 June 1933, the following order was entered: 
This day came the plaintiff by its attorney and moved the 
Court to require John S. Bryan, Receive-r of the Continental 
Trust ·Company, "rho has heretofore filed his petition herein 
to give security -for costs, pursuant to the provisions of Sec-
tion 6407 of the Code of Virginia, which motion the Co1:1rt 
grants, whereupon John S. Bryan, Receiver of the Conti-
nental Trust Company as principal and Charles Pickett as 
surety executed and filed with the papers in this proceeding 
a. bond in the penalty of $150.00 conditioned for the payment 
of costs, which bond is accepted by the Court and thereupon 
the Court on its own motion ordered that this case be con-
tinued to June 19, 1933, for a vacation hearing upon the 
petition of the said John S. Bryan and the replication, de-
Inurrer or motion to strike to be filed by the plaintiff if it be so 
advised. It is further ordered on motion of John S. Bryan, 
Receiver as aforesaid, that the plaintiff be and it is hereby 
required to plead or demur or move to strike out or file any 
objection to said petition of John S. Bryan, Receiver, on or 
before the 12th day of June, 1933, and upon its failure so to 
do the said petition shall be taken for confessed. 
By consent of all parties entered in open Court it is ordered 
that any vacation order entered by the Judge of this Court 
shall have the sa1ne effect as if entered in term time. 
page 16 ~ And on said 5 J nne, 1933, the required bond was 
filed in these words : 
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. KNOW ALL 1\iEN BY ·THESE PRESENTS, That we, 
John S. Bryan, Receiver of Continental Trust Company, as 
principal and Charles Pickett as surety, are held and firmly 
bound unto the Commonwealth of Virginia, in the just and full 
sum of $150.00 to be well and truly paid by the said John 
S. Bryan, Receiver, his successors and assigns and the said 
Charles Pickett, his heirs, administrators and assigns. And 
've hereby waive the benefit -of our homestead exemptions 
as to this obligation. 
Sealed with our seals and dated this 2nd day of J nne, 1933. 
The condition of the above obligation is such that whereas 
Loudoun National Bank has instituted an attachment suit 
against Continental Trust Company in the Circuit Court of 
Fauquier County, Virginia, and whereas John S. Bryan, Re-
ceiver of Continental Trust Company has filed his petition 
claiming title to the property levied upon by virtue of the 
said attachment and whereas pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 6407 of the Code of Virginia, the said John S. Bryan, 
Receiver, as aforesaid, has been required to give security for 
costs. 
Now, therefore, if the said John S. Bryan, Receiver, his 
successors and assigns, and the said Charles Pickett shall pay 
any costs which may be awarded against the said John S. 
· Bryan, Receiver, by reason of the filing of the said petition 
this obligation shall be null and void, otherwise to remain 
in full force and virtue. 
JNO. S. BRYAN, (Seal) 
Receiver for Continental Trust Co. 
CHARLES PICI{ETT, (Seal) 
page 17 ~ And on 12 June, 1933, the plaintiff filed its an-
swer to the said petition of John S. Bryan, Re-
ceiver, in these words: 
And no·w comes the Loudoun N ationa.l Bank of Leesburg 
and for answer to the said petition of John S. Bryan, re-
ceiver of the Continental Trust Company, filed in this cause 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 6407 of the Code of 
Virginia, answers and says: 
First: It denies the right of the said John S. Bryan to 
file said ·petition under a special appearance and having filed 
said answer and having given the bond pursuant to the order 
of the Oourt heretofore entered in this case, respondent says 
that the appearance of the said John S. Bryan, receiver of the 
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said Continental Trust Company, must be held to be a gener~l 
appearance for the purpose set out in said petition. 
Second: Respondent further says, that it neither admits 
nor denies the manner in which the Continental Trust Com-
pany obtained its charter to do ·business in the District of 
Columbia, but respondent calls for strict proof thereof. 
Third: Respondent further denies, that by virtue of title 
five, Section two hundred and ninety-eight of the Code of the 
District of Columbia., that the said Continental Trust Com-
pany subject to the jurisdiction of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, for all of the objects and pruposes that the Comp-
troller of the Currency of the United States can exercise over 
National Banking Associations. 
Fourth: Respondent neither admits nor denies the appoint-
ment of Joseph A. Gamble as the receiver for the said Trust 
Company, as set out in the second paragraph of the said 
petition, on the 28th day of February, 1933, nor 
page 18 ~ does respondent admit or deny his resignation 
becoming effective on March 9, 1933, nor does said 
respondent see the relevancy or materiality of the said alle-
gation in respect to the appointment and resignation of the 
said Joseph A. Gamble as receiver. Respondent likewise has 
no knowledge as to the circumstances under which F. G. Awalt, 
as the acting Comptroller of the Currency, appointed JohnS. 
Bryant received of the Continental Trust Company, to ta'ke 
effect at the close of business on the 9th day of March, 1933. 
and respondent calls for strict proof of the power and au-
thority of the said F. G. A. walt as acting Comptroller of the 
Currency, to make said appointment. 
Fifth: Respondent further says that it has no knowledge as· 
to the bond executed by the said receiver in the penalty of 
fifty thousand dollars, nor whether said bond is one required 
by la,v, but calls for strict proof of the due execution of said 
bond and that said bond so executed is such as is lawfullv 
required. w 
Sixth: R;espondent admits that the Continental Trust Com-
pany is the owner of certain real estate situated in Fauquier 
County, Virginia, and described in the attachment le-vied on 
the same as set out in said attacl1ment proceeding. 
Seventh: Respondent denies that for and on account of the 
things set out in said petition, that by operation of law. the 
title to the said real estate \Vas divested from the said Conti-
nental Trust Company and invested in the said .T ohn S. Bryan 
as receiver of the said Continental Trust Company. 
page 19 ~ Respondent saya_, that the title to the lands located 
in Virginia, under the circumstances set out in said 
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petition, must pass in conformity 'vith the laws of Virginia 
and respondent denies that the said receive·r has the title 
to the said land by operation of law or that he can be au-
thorized to take possession thereof or take title thereto ex-
cept in conformity with the laws of the State of Virginia 
and subject to the lien of the attachment of this respondent .. 
Eighth: Respondent admits that the said attachment was 
sued out of the Clerk's Office of his Court on March 15, 1933, 
but denies that tllis attachment was issued after the Comp-
troller of the Currency had taken charge of said land. On the 
contrary, respondent avers that the land was in t4e care and 
in the possession and in the custody of the Continental Trust 
Company at the date of the levy of said attachment and there 
was absolutely no notice of any character or kind on the 
records of the Clerk's Office of Fauquier County 'vhere said 
land is situated, to put anybody on notice that said land was 
not liable to the debts of the said Continental Trust Com-
pany. 
Ninth: Respondent further says that in as much as John 
" S. Bryan, received, has filed his petition under Section 6407 of 
the Code and that this question of fact, as well as this que~­
tion of la,v, will have .to be disposed of, respondent insists 
that the issue should be made up by this Court and submitted 
~: a jury for its determination, under the instruc-
page 20 r tions of sajd Court. 
THE LOUDOUN NATIONAL BANI( 
OF LEESBURG, 
By EDWIN E. GARRETT, President. 
page 21 } ... ~nd on the 18 day of July, 1933, the following 
order was entered by said Court. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, and John S. 
Bryan, R·eceiver of the Continental Trust Company having 
filed his petition under Section 6407 of the Code of Virginia, 
asserting title to the real estate levied on~ to which petition. 
said Loudoun National Bank filed its answer, in which it prays 
for a trial by a jury; And thereupon came the said John S. 
Bryan, Receiver of said Continental Trust Con1pany, 
by his attorney as well as the Loudoun National Bank by 
its attorney, and an issue 'vas joined on the petition afore-
said of said. Bryan Recehrer and the answer of said Loudoun 
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National Bank. And the said Bryan was made the plaintiff 
on the trial of said issue; and thereupon came a jury of $e 
persons from which two were by consent stricken by lot and 
the remaining seven, to-wit: A. D. Arrington, T. Roy Wright, 
E. W. Bowen, H. L. Grove, E. M. Miller, J. T. Adams and 
S. A. Appleton, were duly delected tried and sworn to try 
the issue aforesaid; And thereupon the plaintiff introduced 
his evidence; and thereupon the defendant on said issue by 
its attorney moved the Court to strike the evidence of the 
plaintiff as being insufficient. And thereupon o~ account 
of the illness of the Judge, the further consideration of this 
case was continued until Monday, ,July 24, 1933; and there-
upon the jury was excused from further attendance in this 
'~ase until Monday, July 24, 1933. 
And the petitioner JohnS. Bryan, Receiver filed a copy of 
the Chatter of the Continental Trust Company, and a cer-
tificate from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(See Bill of Exceptions No. 1, page 21 of this record). 
For instructions to the Jury see Bill of exception, page 32 
of this record. 
page 22 r And on the 24 July, 1933, the following order was 
entered by the Court : 
This day came again the parties by their attorneys, and 
~ame the same jury of seven persons to-wit: A. D. Arrington, 
T. Roy Wright, E. vV. Bowen, H. L. Grove, E. l\L Miller, 
.T. T. Adams and S. A. Appleton, and the Court having con-
sidered the n1otion to strike the evidence, and being of opinion 
that the said motion was without merit, it is ordered that the 
said motion be and the same hereby is denied, to which action 
of the Court the Loudoun National Bank by counsel excepted~ 
and thereupon introdnrecl ih~ ~virle.nce. and the introduction 
of evidence being completed, the Loudoun National Ba.nk re-
quested the Court to give two certain instructions to the Jury, 
identified as Instructions A and B respectively, which in-
structions the Court refused to give to which action of the 
Court the Loudoun National Bank excepted and assigned 
reasons therefor; and thereupon the Court of its own motion 
instructed the jury as shown by Instructions No. 1, to which 
nction of the Court, the- Loudoun National Bank by counsel 
excepted and again assigned reasons for said exceptions; 
and thereupon the jury having received the instructions from 
the Court and having retired to their room with the papers 
in the case presently returned into Court with the following 
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verdict, to-wit: We, the jury, on the issue joined, find for 
the petitioner, John S. Bryan, Receiver of Continental Trust 
Company; and thereupon the Loudoun National Bank moved 
the Court to set aside the . verdict of the J nry, assigning as 
reasons therefor, first, that said verdict is contrary to the 
law and the eYidenee; second, for the misdirection of the 
Court during the course of the trial in granting the instruc-
tion for John S. Bryan Receiver, the plaintiff, and in re-
fusing instructions offered by the Loudoun National Bank of 
Leesburg, the defendant, which motion the Court overruled, 
to which action of the Court, the defendant ex-
page 23 } cepted, and leave is given to said Loudoun National 
Bank of Leesburg, to prepare .and pressnt its bills 
of exception to this Court within sixty days from this date; 
It is therefore considered by the Court that the attachment 
of Loudoun National Bank, Leesburg, Va., ana the levy made 
thereon pursuant thereto, on the lands of the Continental 
Trust Con1pany as set out in said attachment be a.nd the 
same are hereby abated and quashed, to which action of the 
Court the defendant by counsel excepted, and leave is like-
"Tise granted the defendant sixty days within which to tender 
l1is bill of exceptions. 
And on the 23 day. of August, 1933, the following order was 
entered by the Oourt: 
This day came the Loudoun National Bank of Leesburg, 
by its attorney, and represented to me, J. R. H. Alexander, 
,Judge of the said Court, that it desired to present to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia its petition for a writ 
of error and sttpersedeas, to the judgment of this Court ren-
. dered on the 24th day of .July, 1933, and made application 
for an order suspending the execution of said judgment for 
a period of three months from the date hereof, under Section 
6338 of the 1930 Code of Virginia; on consideration whereof, 
it is hereby ordered that the execution of said judgment be 
and the same is hereby suspended for the period aforesaid. 
But this suspension is on the condition that said bank shall 
on or before the 1st day of September, 1933, execute a sus-
. pending bond, with surety, before the Clerk of this Court 
in the penalty of two hundred and fifty dollars, conditioned 
according to law. Given under my hand this 22nd day of 
August, 1933. 
page 24 r And on 13 September 1933, the plaintiff :filed its 
Bills of exception Nos. 1, 2 and 3, in these words : 
-----------
56 ~upreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
E. E. Garrett, Esquire, 
Attorney at Law, 
Leesburg, Virginia. 
Dear ~Ir. Garrett : 
Fairfax, Virginia, 
September 9, 1933. 
Loudoun National Bank vs. Continental Trust Company-
re #3718. 
I have your letter of September 7th, and in view of the 
fact that the certificate of lVIr. Gough sets forth the facts 
contained in the second paragraph of my letter of September 
6th and the bill ·of exceptions shows that the certificate was 
introduced in evidence, I am willing to have the bills signed 
by Judge Alexander in the form submitted by you. 
I am sending copy of this letter to J udg·e Alexander as 
evidence of my acceptance of service of notice of the presen-
tation of the bills of exception. 
Very truly yours, 
CHARLES PICKETT. 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS #1. 
Be it rem·embered, that after the jury. was sworn to try 
the issue joined in this case on the petition filed herein by 
John S. Bryan, Receiver of the Continental Trust Company 
and the ans,ver thereto filed by the Loudoun National Bank 
of Leesburg, the. said Bryan, to maintain the issue on his 
part, after being duly sworn, testified that he resided at Belle-
haven in Virginia; that he was the receiver of The Conti-
nental Trust Company appointed by F. G. Awalt, the acting 
Comptroller of the Currency, and that, under the 
page 25 ~ order appointing him, he wa.s required to give a 
bond in the penalty of fifty thousand dollars and 
that he had given the said bond and he then offered in evi-
dence, before the jury, the certified c~py of his commission · 
issued by E. H. Gough, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, 
which was filed as an exhibit with his petition in this case 
and the said Bryan, through his counsel, then offered in evi-
dence a copy of the charter of The Continental Trust Com-
pa?y, together with a copy of the application for the same, 
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which were like-wise given to the jury and a copy of the re-
port of the Co1nptroller of the Currency in the matter of 
The Continental rrrust Company, which are as follows: 
"WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, do by these presents, pur-
suant to the provisions of Sub-Chapter XI of Chapter XVIII 
of the Code of Law of the District of Colun1bia, associate 
ourselves together as a company or body corporate to carry 
on a trust, loan, mortgage and such other business of what-
soever nature, as is authorized by said Sub-Chapter, and 
do hereby certify: 
First: That the name of the company shall be the "Conti-
nental Trust Company". 
Second: That the purposes for wllich said Company is 
formed are: 
(1) To accept and execute trusts, duties and powers of any 
and every description which may, with its consent, be com-
mitted or transferred to it by any person or persons, public 
or private corpora t.ion, bodies corporate or politic, or by any 
court of record or other authority. 
(2) To accept the office and appointn1ent and perform the 
duties and exercise the powers of -executor, administrator, 
collector of estate or property, guardian of the estate of 
· minors, receiver, assignee, committee of the estate 
page 26 ~ of lunatics and idiots, and trustee of any kind, 
which such office or appointment is committed or 
transferred to said co1npany, with its consent, by any person, 
public or private corporation, body corporate or politic, or by 
any court of record or other lawful authority. 
(3) To receive deposits of money for the purposes desig-
nated in said Sub-Chapter, to loan money upon real and per-
sonal property as security, as well as the security of endorse-
ments, and charge and receive interest thereon and commis-
sions therefor. 
( 4) To act as agents for the purpose of issuing, registering, 
transferring and countersigning, and also to underwrite, the 
Rtocks, bonds, or obligations of any corporation, association, 
municipality or state, or other public authority, and to re-
P.eive and manage any sinldng fnnd or other funds on such 
terms as may be agreed upon. 
( 5) To issue its debenture bonds upon deeds of trust or 
mortgages of real estate as provided by Section 721 of said 
Oode. 
(6} To underwrite, own, buy and sell bonds of the United 
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States, of the District of Columbia and of the several States 
and of any municipality, private corporation, or association, 
and other evidences of indebtedness, as well as the stock of 
.any public or private corporation .. 
( 7) To transact such other business and to exercise such 
other powers and perform such duties with reference thereto 
as are authorized by the provisions of said Bub-Chapter re-
ferred to in the first paragraph of this certificate. 
Third: The term for which this company is to exist shall be 
fifty (50) years, subject to being enlarged with the approval 
of Congress as provided by Section 727 of said Sub-Chapter. 
Fourth: The number o£ directors for this company shall be 
not less than nine ( 9) nor more than thirty ( 30) and the 
directors for the first year, together with others to be· here-
after selected by the persons herein after named, shall be: 
W. G. Carter, E. C. Davisson, R. J. Ernshaw, F. H. 
page 27 ~ Edmonds, W. T. Galliher, J. Wm:. Henry, J. L. Kar-
r:ick, G. A. Landmesser, John C .. Letts, Isaac T. . 
Mann, W. R. 1\{erriam, P. T. 1\tioran, Samuel J. Prescott, C. G. 
Pfluger, N. B. Scott, Elie Sheetz, W. M. Sprigg, J os. Stras-
burger, Allan E. Walker, Chas. W. 'Varden, Bates Warren, 
Charles H. Zehnder, all of whom are stockholders and a 
majority of whom are residents of the District of Columbia. 
Fifth: That the officers, all of whom are stockholders of 
the Company, who for the first year are to manage. the affairs 
of the Company will be : 
President Nathan B. Scott 
First Vice-President and Treasurer Charles W. Warden 
Vice-Presidents W. T. Galliher & Bates Warren 
General Counsel Charles A. Douglas 
Trust Officer and Secretary Frank S. Bright 
Sixth: The capital stock of the company shall be One Mil-
lion Dollars ($1,000,000) divided into shares of the par value 
of One Hundred Dollars ($100) each, all of which said capital 
stock has been fully subscribed. 
Nathan B. Scott, (Seal) 
Bates Warren, (Seal) 
Chas. A. Douglas, (Seal) 
Gen. l\tiorris Hork-
heimer, 
By N. B. Scott, 
Atty., · (Seal) 
Oharles W. 
Warden, (Seal) 
W. T. Galliher, (Seal) 
FrankS. Bright, (Seal) 
Samuel J. Prescott, 
By W .. T. Galliher, 
Atty., (Seal) . 
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B. W. Peterson, 
By N. B. Scott, 
Atty., . 
C. H. Zehnder, 







C. E. Galliher, 
C. E. West, 








· John C. Scofield, (Seal) 
G. A. Landmesser, (Seal) 
Allan E. Walker, (Seal) 
Charles G. 
Pfluger, (Seal) 
William G. Carter, (Seal) 
F. H. Edmonds, (Seal) 
Elie Sheetz, (Seal) 
R. J. Earnshaw, (Seal) 
Joseph B. Espey, (Seal) 
District of Columbia, ss: 
G. T. Scott, 
By N. B. Scott, 
Atty., 
B. L. Dulaney, 






George E. Walker, (Seal) 
James L. Mar-
shall, 





J. William Kenny, (Seal) 
Thos. H. Melton, (Seal) 





James L. Karrick, (Seal) 
William H. 
Sholes, (Seal) 
C. M. Warner, (Seal) 
By Paul Dulaney, Atty. 
I, Elmer E. Ramey, a notary public in and for the District 
of Columbia, hereby certify that Nathan B .. Scott, Benjamin 
L. Dulaney ·by Paul Dulaney, Attorney, Thomas Somerville, 
W. T. Galliher, Bates Warren, B. W. Peterson, by N. B. Scott, 
Attorney, Charles W. Warden, John C. S'cho:field, William 
0.. Carter, G. A. Landmesser, C. B. Hart, Joseph Stras-
burger, Allan E. Walker, James L. Karrick, Colin H. Living-
stone, G. T. Scott, By ·N. B. Scott, Attorney, Paul Dulaney, 
F. H. Edmonds, General Morris Horkheimer by N. B. Scott, 
Attorney, C. E. Galliher, William M. Sprigg, Frank S. Bright, 
.T. William fienry, ·charles G. Pfluger, George M. Bowers, 
Charles A. Douglas, James L. Marshall, S. J. Prescott, 
Thomas H. 1\felton, George E. Walker, F. V. Killian, C. E. 
West, Elie Sheetz, A. C. West, Charles H. Sehnder by Paul 
Dulaney, Attorney, Charles M. W a.rner by Paul Dulaney, At-
torney, William H. Sholes, R. J. Earnshaw and John B. Espey 
whose names are signed to the writing hereto annexed, bear-
ing date· the 24th day of January, A. D. 1921, personally 
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appeared before me on the day a.nd year aforesaid and sep-
arately and severally ackno,vledged (che same before me, 
and that they had each severally signed and sealed said in-
strument for the purposes therein set forth. 
Given u·rider my hand and notarial seal this 24th day of 
January, .A: D. 1912. · 
(Notarial Seal) 
E. E. RAMEY, 
Notary Public, D. C. 
page 29 ~ CERTIFICATE OF INC0RPORATION OF THE 
"CONTINENTAL TRUST COM-
PANY''. 
!{now All 1\fen by these presents, that whereas Nathan B. 
Scott, Benjamin L. Dulaney, Thomas Sonwrville, W. T. Galli: 
her, Bates vVarren, B. W. Peterson, Charles W. Warden, 
John C. Scofield, William G. Carter, G. A. Landmesser, C. B. 
Hart, Joseph .Strasburger, Allan E. "\\7alker, James L. Kar-
rick, Colin H. Livingstone, G. T. Scott, Paul Dulaney, F. 11. 
Edmonds, General. Morris I-Iorkheimer, C. E .. Galliher, \Vil-
liam M. Sprigg, Frank S. Bright, J. William I-Ienry, Charles 
G. Pfluger, Goerge ~L Bowers, Charles A. Douglas, James L. 
~iarshall, S'. J .. Prescott, Thomas H. 1\felton, George E. 
Walker, F. V. IG.llian, C. E. vVest, Elie Sheetz, A. C. West, 
Charles H. Sehnder, Charles ~L vVarner, vVilliam H. Sholes, 
R. J. Earnshaw and John B. Espey, having executed before 
an officer in the District of Columbia competent to take the 
acknowledgment of deeds the organization certificate of the 
Continental Trust Company of the District of Columbia, in 
accordance with the provisions of Sub-Chapter XI of Chap..: 
ter XVIII of the Code of Laws of the District of Columbia, 
said organization certificate setting forth: 
1. The name of the corporation. 
2. The purposes for which it is formed. 
3. The term for which it is to exist, not exceeding the term· 
of fifty years. 
4. The number of directors and the names of the officers 
who are for the first year to 1nanage the affairs of the Com-
pany. 
5. The amount of the capital stock and its subdivision into 
shares. 
And whereas, They have also presented the said certificate 
to us together with due proof of notice of intention to apply 
to us for a charter under aforesaid chapter. 
Now therefore, we hereby grant to said persons a charter 
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of incorporation upon the ter1ns set forth in said certificate 
and application. 
In testimony whereof, we have hereunto set our hands and 
seals this the 25th day of January in the year of our Lord 
one thousand nine hundred and twelve. 
CUNO H. RUDOLPH, (Seal) 
page 30 }- JOifN A. JOHNSTON, (Seal) 
W. V. JUDSON, (Seal) 
Commissioners of the District of Columbia. 
Office of the Recorder of Deeds District of Columbia. 
This is to certify tha.t the foregoing is a true and verified 
copy of the Certificate of Incorporation of the Continental 
Trust Company and of the whole of said Certificate of Incor-
poration, as filed in this Office the 30th day of January, 1912, 
and recorded in Liber 29, folio 29, et seq., one of the Incor-
poration Records of the District of Columbia. 
In testin1ony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and af-
fixed the sPal of this Office this 14th day of July, A. D. 1933. 
Report 
(Signed) JEFFERSON S. CO.AGJTI, 
Recorder of Deeds, D. C. 
TREASURY DEP ART~IENT, 
Office . of a·omptroller of the Currency, 
VVashing1:on, D. C. 
'VHER.EAS, the "CONTINENT.AL TRUST COM-
PANY", located in the District of Columbia, has filed with me 
a copy of its certificate of organization and charter under the 
provisions of sub-chapter eleven of chapter eighteen of the 
Code of Laws of the District of Colun1bia.: 
AND 'V'HEREAS, the said Company has satisfied me that 
its capital stock of One 1\Iillion Dollars ($1,000,000) has been 
fully subscribed, and that Five Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($500,000) fifty per centum of the said capital has been paid 
in cash: 
AND WHEREAS, the said Company has deposited with 
me eight (8) certificates of deposit on the American National 
Bank of Washington to the aggregate amount of One Hun-
dred and Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($12,000), being one-
fourth of its capital stock paid in as aforesaid, the said cer-
tificate of deposit to be kept by me for the purposes and upon 
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the trust provided for in and by said sub-chap-
page 31 ~ ter : 
This is to certify that the said Company has complied 
with the requirements of said sub-chapter and is entitled to 
have and exercise in the District of Columbia all the gen-
eral and special powers conferred and perform the duties im-
posed by said sub-chapter on corporations organized under 
the first division of section 1 of said sub-chapter to carry on 
a safe deposit, trust, loan and mortgage business and act as 
administrator, executor, guardian of the estate of a minor, 
and undertake any other kindred fiduciary duty which may be 
lawfully undertaken by corporations organized under sub-
division one of the first section of the said sub-chapter eleven 
of chapter eighteen of the Code of Laws of the District of 
Columbia. 
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and 
seal of office this First day of February, 1912. 
LAURENCE 0. MURRAY, Comptroller. 
(Comptroller Seal) 
Office of the Recorder of Deeds District of Columbia. 
This is to certify that the foregoing is a t_rue and verified 
copy of the Report of Comptroller of the Currency in the mat-
ter of Continental Trust Company and of the whole of said 
report, as filed in this Office the 7th day of February, A. D. 
1912, and recorded in Liber 29, folio 49, et seq .. one of the In-
corporation Records of the ~istrict of Columbia. 
In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and 
affixed the seal of this office this 14th day of July, A. D. 1933. 
(Signed) JEFFERSON S. COAGE. 
Recorder of Deeds, D. C.'' 
And the said Bryan further testified that he was still the 
receiver of the said Continental Trust Company and the 
Court now certifies that this 'vas all the evidence introduced 
by the said JohnS. Bryan, receiver; and thereupon, the Lou-
doun National Bank, by its counsel, moved to. strike out the 
evidence as insufficient for the purpose of establishing the 
claim of the ~aid Continental Tn1st Company, that the title to 
the land in Fauquier County, Virginia, levied on under the at-
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tachment of the Loudoun National Bank of Lees-
page 32 }- burg was in the said JohnS. Bryan, Receiver, and 
the Court, after hearing the argument of counsel, 
refused to strike out the said evidence as being insufficient for 
the purpose aforesaid and directed the trial to proceed, to 
which action of the Court in refusing to strike out the evi-
dence aforesaid on the ground aforesaid, the Loudoun 
National Bank of Leesburg, by its couns·el, excepted and ten-
ders this, its bill of exceptions, which it prays may be signed, 
sealed and made a part of the record in this cause, and the 
same is accordingly done. 
And this is signed as bill of exceptions No. 1, this 12 day 
of September, 1933. . 
J. R. H . .ALEXANDER, Judge. 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS #2. 
Be it remembered that after the jury was sworn to try the 
issue joined in this case on the petition filed herein by John 
S. Bryan, Receiver of the Continental Trust Company and the 
answer thereto filed by the Loudoun National Bank of Lees-
burg and after the said John S'. Bryan had introduced his 
evidence set forth in the bill of exceptions number one and 
after the Court had refused to strike out the said evidence, 
· the defendant offered in evidence the deeds of record in the 
. Clerk's Office of Fauquier County, showing that the titla to 
the lauds levied on, was in the Continental Trust Company 
and it was agreed, by counsel for the ~titioner and the said 
Bank that the Court should advise the jury that the records 
in the Clerk's Office of Fauquier County showed the title 
to the said lands had been conveyed to the said Continental 
Trust Company at the time that the attachment was levied and 
the Court so told the jury. 
And thereupon, the counsel for the Loudoun National Bank . 
introduced the. record of the Attachment in this case, the pe-
tition, the attachment and the leyy of the attachment on said 
lands and this evidence, together with the evidence intro-
duced by the said· John S. Bryan as set forth in the bill of 
exceptions number one; and thereupon, the said 
page 33 } John S. Bryan, receiver, offered the two instruc-
. tions to which the counsel for the Loudoun National 
Bank objected. 
'• The Court instructs the jury that the evidence in this case 
shows that as a matter of la:w, the title to the land in contro-
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versy is vested in John S. Bryan, Receiver of Continental 
Trust Company, and was so vested at the time of the levy 
of the attachment. 
The Court further instructs the jury that if they believe 
from the evidence that the title to said land is vested in John 
S. Bryan, Receiver, their verdict shall be for him on the 
issue· joined.'' 
To which instructions the counsel for the Loudoun National· 
Bank objected aforesaid and thereupon the Court prepared 
the following in~truction, ·which the Court submitted to the 
jury in lieu of the 2 instructions aforesaid, which is as fol-
lo,vs: . 
''The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that the Continental Trust Company was a trust 
Company organized under the laws of the District of Colum-
bit; that the Comptroller of the Currency of the United 
States, in the exercise of the duties of his office took charge 
of and assumed control of the affairs of said Trust Com-
pany and appointed JohnS. Bryan, the intervening petitioner 
in this action, the Heceiver of the Assets of said Trust Com-
pany, and that the said Bryan has executed the bond ac-
quired of him, then the said Bryan thereby, by operation of 
law, became the holder of the legal title to all of the assets 
of said Trust Company, including the subject to this attach-
ment, and your verdict should be for said Receiver." 
To which action of ·the Court in granting said instruction 
the counsel for the Loudoun National Bank excepted. And 
thereupon the counsel for the Continental Trust Company 
withdrew two instructions offered by him . 
.And, to this action of the Court in granting the instruc-
tions so provided by the Court, the Loudoun N a.tional Bank 
of Leesburg excepted and tenders this, its bill of 
page 34 ~ exceptions, which it _prays may he signed, sealed 
and made a part of the record in this case. And 
the same is accordingly done and this is bill of exceptions 
number 2, this 12 day of September, 1933. 
J. R. H. ALEXANDER, ~udge. 
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BILL OF EXCEPTIONS #3. 
Be it remembered that after the jury was sworn to try the 
issue joined in this case on the petition :filed herein by John 
S. Bryan, Receiver of the Continental Trust Company and 
the answer thereto :filed bv the Loudoun National Bank of 
Leesburg· and after the said John S. Bryan had introduced 
his evidence set forth in the bill of exceptions number one 
and after the Court had refused to strike out the said evi-
dence, the defendant offered in evidence the deeds of record 
in the Clerk's Office of Fauquier County, showing that the title 
to the lands levied on, was in the Continental Trust Company 
and it was agreed, by counsel for the petitioner and the said 
Bank that the Court should advise the jury that the records 
in the Clerk's Office of Fauquier County showed the title to 
the said lands had been conveyed to the said Continental 
Trust Company at the time that the attacfunent was levied 
and the Court so told the jury; 
And thereupon, the counsel for the Loudoun National Bank 
introduced the record of the attachment in this case, the pe-
tition the attachment and the levy of the attachment on said 
la~ds ·and this evidence, together with the evidence intro-
duced by ~he said John S. Bryan as set forth in the bill of 
exceptions number one; the Court noF certifies constitutes 
all the evidence introduced on this hearing; and thereupon 
the Loudoun National Bank of Leesburg by its counsel, ·of-
fered the following instructions, which are as follows·: 
''The Court instructs the jury that even though they shall 
believe from the evidence that John S. Bryan was appointed 
receiver of the Continental Trust Company and has given 
bond as such and is now the receiver of said Continental Trust 
Con1pany yet these facts do not invest him with the title 
to the real estate levied on under the attachment in this cas~. 
The Court instructs the jury that even though 
page 35 ~ they believe from the evidence that John S. Bryan 
was appointed receiver of the Continental Trust 
Company and has given bond as such and is now the re-
ceiver of said Continental Trust Company and bas an interest 
in the lands of. the Continental Trust Company situated in 
Fauquier County conveyed to said Company by deeds of 
record in the Clerk's Office of Fauquier County, yet it is for 
the jury to determine or not said receiver takes said lands 
subject to the attachment of the Loudoun N at.ional Bank.'' 
"'Thich instructions the Court refused to grant and to which 
action of the Court the Loudoun N a tiona! Bank of Lees burg 
• 
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excepted and tenders this, its bill of exceptions, which it prays 
may be signed and sealed and made a part of the record in 
this case. And the same is accordingly done and this is bill 
of exceptions number 3, this 12 day of September, 1933. 
J. R. H. ALEXANDER, Judge. 
page 36 r The following instructions are certified by the 
Judge of the Court as having been offered in this 
case. 
The Court instructs the jury that the evidence in this case 
shows that as a matter of law, the title to the land in con-
troversy is vested in John S. Bryan, Receiver of Continental 
Trust Company, }and was so vested at the time of the levy of 
the attachment. 
The foregoing instruction was offered by John S. Bryan, 
Receiver and was withdrawn on the suggestion of the Court. 
Teste this 12th day of September, 1933. 
J. R. II. ALEXANDER, Judge. 
The Court further instructs the jury that if they believe 
from the evidence that the title to said land is vested in John 
S. Bryan, Receiver, their verdict shall be for him on the 
issue joined. 
·The foregoing instructions was offered by John S. Bryan, 
Receiver and was withdrawn on the suggestion of the Court. 
Teste this 12th day of September, 1933. 
J. R. H. ALEXANDER, Judge. 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that the Continental Trust Company was a trust 
Company organized under the laws of the District of Colum-
bia; tl1at the Comptroller of the ~Currency of the United 
States, in the exercise of the duties of his office took charge 
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of and assumed control of the affairs of said Trust Com-
pany and appointed John S. Bryan, the intervening petitioner 
in this action, the. Receiver of the Assets of said Trust Com-
pany, and that the said Bryan has executed the bond acquired 
of him, then the said Bryan tnereby, by operation . 
page 37 ~ of law, because the. holder of the legal title to all 
of the ass.ets of said Trust Company, ·including the 
subject of this attachment, and your verdict should be for 
said Receiver. 
The foregoing instruction was presented and granted by 
the Court in lieu of instructions number 1 and 2, which were 
withdrawn, and the defendant except to the granting of this 
instruction. . · 
Teste this 12 day of September, 1933. 
J. R. H. ALEXANDER, Judge. 
The Court instructs the jury that even though they shall 
believe from the evidence that John S. Bryan was appointed 
receiver of the Continental Trust Company and has given 
bond as such and is now the receiver of said Continental 
Trust Company yet these facts do not invest him with the 
title to the real estate levied on under the attachment in this 
case. 
The foregoing instruction requested by the Loudoun 
National Bank of Leesburg, the defendant, was denied, and 
the defendant excepted. 
Test~ this 12 day of September, 1933. 
J. R. H. ALEXANDER, Judge. 
The Court instructs the jury that even though they be-
lieve from the evidence that John S'. Bryan 'vas appointed 
receiver of t4.e Continental Trust Company and has given 
bond as such and is now the receiver of said Continental 
Trust Company and has an interest in the lands of the Conti-
nental Trust Company and has an interest in the lands of 
the Continental Trust Company situated in Fauquier County 
conveyed to said Company by deeds of record in the Clerk's 
Office of Fauquier County, yet it is for the jury to determine 
whether or not said receiver takes sa.id lands subject to the 
attachment of the Loudoun National Bank. 
- -- --- -~--------;:-" . 
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page 38 ~ The foregoing instruction requested by the Lou-
doun National Bank of Leesburg, the defendant, 
wa.s d_enied, and the defendant' excepted. 
Teste this 12 day· of September, 1933. 
J. R. H. ALEXANDER, Judge. 
page 39 ~ I, T. E. Barten stein, Clerk of the Circuit Court 
of Fauquier County in the State of Virginia, here-
by certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of 
the record of the case styled Loudoun National Bank of Lees-
burg, Virginia, pltff. vs. the Continental Tru.st Company, a 
corporation, lately pending in said Court. 
I further certify that the notice required by Section 6339 
of the Code of Virginia, has been duly given in accordance 
with said section. · 
Given under my hand this 17th day of October, 1933. 
T. E. BART~NSTElN, Clerk. 
Cost of copy of record, 16.00. 
A Copy-Teste: 
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